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Few types of antitrust conduct have received as much treat-
ment from the Supreme Court as tying arrangements.' This prac-
tice, which is unlawful per se when certain prerequisites are met,
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Univ. of Pennsylvania,
1965; J.D., Harvard University, 1969.
1. There have been 11 Supreme Court opinions in government or private treble damage
actions against sellers allegedly employing tying arrangements. United States Steel Corp. v.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as "Fortner IT'];
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) [hereinafter
referred to as "Fortner I']; United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
The Court has also considered conduct highly similar to tying arrangements in three
recent actions against sellers by the Federal Trade Commission under § 5 of the FTC Act.
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965). See also FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S.
463 (1923); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
Furthermore, the legality of tying arrangements has been considered by the Supreme
Court in numerous actions for patent infringement or patent misuse brought by the holder
of a patent who had insisted that its licensee use a particular product in conjunction with
the patented product or process. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regula-
tor Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488 (1942); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. v. Ameri-
can Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Leeds & Catlin
Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
Finally, there are important dicta regarding tying arrangements in two other cases, going
beyond the learning of the decisions above. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 329-31 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-07 (1949).
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"may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product [the
tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also pur-
chases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will
not purchase that product from any other supplier."' 2 Notwithstand-
ing this extensive Supreme Court attention, there is as much heat
as light in this area. The doctrine that has developed is often unpre-
dictable and frequently irrational, and the applicable rules make
the analysis far more complicated than necessary. A simpler and
more direct approach is long overdue.
Present analysis consists of three steps. First, a court must
determine whether there indeed is a tying arrangement-the
"existence" question. One variation of this determination is
whether there really is a tie at all, or whether the two (or more)
things sold are merely parts of one "package." Alternatively, the
seller may require the buyer-usually a retailer-simply to stock the
entire line of the seller's goods, but will impose no requirement of
buying certain fixed quantities of each item in the seller's line. Or,
the seller may not coerce the buyer or expressly require the purchase
of the tied product; the existence of the tying arrangement will have
to be inferred from the conduct of the parties.
3
Next, the court will have to determine whether this is the par-
ticular type of tying arrangement which should be held unlaw-
ful-the "liability" question. Although it will be rare to find tie-ins
which have procompetitive effects, there nonetheless are three cate-
gories of tying arrangements-those which are always unlawful
(those unreasonable per se), those which are unlawful only after a
rule of reason inquiry, and those which are not unlawful under either
approach.4 Then the crazy quilt continues. Tying arrangements are
2. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). As used in this Article,
the term "product" includes not only goods or commodities, but also intangibles such as land,
money and services. Similarly, references to the buyer and seller also include the lessee and
lessor, or licensee and licensor. Cf. Bazal v. Belford Trucking Co., 442 F. Supp. 1089, 1094
(S.D. Fla. 1977) ("privilege" of obtaining contract of employment may be "good or service").
3. For example, the seller may merely urge the buyer to take both products, or it may
simply offer a lower price for the package than for the separate units, or it may so structure
its marketing practices as to make the purchase of both products a practical necessity.
4. The per se rule governing tying arrangements is quite different from that applicable,
for example, to price fixing. Once conduct is characterized as price fixing it is always illegal.
Tie-ins, however, are illegal per se only when certain conditions are met. Furthermore, even
those tie-ins may be found lawful if the conduct falls within certain enumerated defenses.
The Court's ambivalence is reflected in a statement in White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963): "Tying arrangements. . . may fall in [the per se] category, though
not necessarily so." See generally Baldwin & McFarland, Some Observations on "Per Se"
and Tying Arrangements, 6 ANTIRUST BuLL. 433 (1961); Singer, Market Power and Tying
Arrangements, 8 ANTrrRusT BuLL. 653, 655-56, 667 (1963).
The evaluation of the legality of the tie-in involves a determination of whether the seller
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analyzed under two different antitrust statutes-section 1 of the
Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.5 For unexplained
reasons, the Supreme Court created different standards for applying
the per se rule, depending on the statute used;' today, however,
there is serious doubt whether there still are two or only one test.
Even when one knows the appropriate statute and standard to
apply, recent cases have displayed a remarkable level of diversity
and confusion in the application of the standard to the facts under
consideration. Finally, the Court has recognized occasional defenses
even to those tie-ins which would fall under the so-called per se rule.
Although the existence of such defenses would appear to be an ob-
vious contradiction in terms, it is nonetheless expressly sanctioned
by the cases. It is certainly time to clarify some of these inconsisten-
cies.
This Article will first examine the legal and economic theories
applicable to tying arrangements. The Article will then examine the
present confused state of the law, and will conclude by proposing a
simplified test for evaluating future conduct. The Supreme Court
has stated that "tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose be-
yond the suppression of competition."' If this is true, there is no
logical justification for the two separate steps of the analysis, distin-
guishing the "existence" and "liability" issues; therefore, it is pro-
posed that they be combined. In determining whether there is a tie,
it may be relevant to determine whether the defendant has market
power, and whether it has actually used that power. However, once
a tie is found to exist, this should conclusively establish liability.
The only remaining issue would be whether the defendant could
show special facts that would justify the imposition of the tie-in,
has "sufficient economic power in the tying product market" and whether a "not insubstan-
tial amount of commerce has been restrained in the tied product market." See, e.g., Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969).
5. Actually, it would be more accurate to say that there are three controlling statutes,
since § 5 of the FTC Act also reaches tying arrangements, and that statute has been held to
reach antitrust violations "in their incipiency." See notes 205-07 infra and accompanying
text.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act also proscribes certain exclusive dealing arrange-
ments-situations in which a sale is made only on the condition that the buyer not purchase
the products of any of the seller's competitors. Exclusive dealing-not dealt with in this
Article-can have many of the same adverse effects on competition as tie-ins. See, e.g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 300-15 (1949); Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying
and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 539 (1968).
6. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
7. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), quoted in
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969); United States
v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
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notwithstanding the strong presumption that all tie-ins injure com-
petition.
This approach is based on the following conclusions: (1) There
are a variety of reasons for a seller to impose tying arrangements.
However, in some cases, at least one reason the seller wants to
impose the tie is to leverage its market power in the tying product
to obtain added sales in the market for the tied product. (2) The use
of this leverage power will have anticompetitive effects, particularly
the foreclosure of competition in the tied product market. (3) Al-
though there are several other reasons a seller may have for impos-
ing the tie, tie-ins in general do not produce any economic benefits,
except in certain specific situations, and may lead to other societal
losses. (4) Therefore, again with certain specific exceptions, there
will be no economic loss from condemning all tying arrangements,
regardless of the seller's motivations. Condemning them all will
provide a clear line for businessmen and courts, and will simplify
judicial application of the rule.
II. EFFECTS OF THE CONDUCT ON COMPETITION
The Supreme Court has recently reminded us to examine the
economic realities of all conduct subject to the antitrust laws.' At
the same time, we must also be mindful of judicial realities. Not
only is a per se approach easier, quicker, cheaper and surer for the
courts to enforce, it has greater deterrent Value, thereby broadening
the scope of conduct that never reaches the courts.'
This Section will examine why lawyers find tying arrangements
improper; why economists find such conduct usually inappropriate
for judicial condemnation; and why the attempted economic justifi-
cations for lenient treatment of tying arrangements are inade-
quate.10 This Section will therefore provide a predicate for the con-
8. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977). "[D]eparture
from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather
than ... upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 58-59.
9. For a more detailed description of the advantages of the per se approach, see Bauer,
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM.
L. Rav. 685, 694-96 (1979). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 50 n.16 (1977); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-10 & n.10 (1972);
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
10. For stylistic reasons, I have contrasted the "judicial" view, or the "view of lawyers,"
with the "economists' position." This shorthand is adopted for the sake of convenience.
Although these labels are probably accurate at least for a majority of the occupants of each
camp, there is no intention to suggest that the views here are any more monolithic than in
any other area of antitrust. Therefore, the qualification "only some lawyers" or "only some
economists" should be understood at appropriate places in this Article.
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clusion of this Article-that courts ought to continue, or even in-
crease, their strict, per se treatment of tie-ins.
A. Legal Analysis
The case law has identified three potential adverse effects of
tying arrangements. First, they may injure competitors of the seller
for the tied product (the "foreclosure" effect). Second, they may
make it more difficult for would-be competitors to compete in both
the tying and tied product markets (the "barriers to entry" effect).
Third, they may force the buyer either to take goods that it does not
want, or to take those goods from a supplier other than the one it
might have chosen absent the tie (the "coercion" effect). Present
law also recognizes that tying arrangements may occasionally yield
advantages to the seller without adversely affecting competition
(the "defenses").
Economists argue that tying arrangements rarely have the ad-
verse effects on competition ascribed to them. They argue that sell-
ers who use tie-ins are usually motivated by other objectives, and
that these tie-ins have no adverse effect on competition. Finally,
economists agree with those cases which recognize as defenses cer-
tain specific procompetitive results which flow from some tying ar-
rangements. This Section will examine these two often conflicting
views, and will then offer an intermediate synthesis of these two
approaches.
1. Effect On Competitors of the Seller (Foreclosure)
The traditional judicial objection to tying arrangements is that
they may foreclose competitors of the seller from opportunities to
make sales of the tied product." The seller uses the leverage of the
tying product to obtain sales in the tied product market, thereby
excluding its competitors on grounds unrelated to the inherent qual-
ities of the tied product. For example, in International Business
Machines Corp. v. United States, 12 the defendant agreed to lease its
tabulating and sorting machines only on the condition that lessees
also purchase its tabulating cards. The defendant was guaranteed
a certain volume of sales in the card market, not based solely on the
quality or price of its product, but because of the leverage it could
exercise from its power in the tying product market. Competitors of
11. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See generally Note and
Comment, The Logic of Foreclosure: Tie-in Doctrine after Fortner v. U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L.J.
86 (1969).
12. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
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the seller who wished to attempt to sell cards to the lessees were
foreclosed from that potential market because of the tying arrange-
ment. ,
3
2. Effect on Would-be Competitors (Barriers to Entry)
A second result of a tying arrangement is that it may make it
more difficult for a would-be competitor to obtain sales in either the
tying or tied product market. Barriers to entry are raised by increas-
ing the probability that the company will have to enter at both
levels. For example, in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United
States'4 the defendant, which leased machines to shoe manufactur-
ers only on the condition that they also purchase its supplies, ac-
counted for upwards of ninety-five percent of the shoe machinery
market. With the defendant's tying arrangements in existence, if
another company wished to enter the supplies market, all of defen-
dant's lessees would have been excluded as potential customers. To
enter the supplies market, the potential entrant would also have
had to enter the machine market, with the relatively enormous costs
of inventing around defendant's product, marketing expenses, and
so forth. There is little doubt that, because of capital costs and risks
of failure, it is more difficult to enter two markets simultaneously
than merely to enter one at a time. Another although admittedly
less serious problem is that with that potential manufacturer having
been deterred from entry into the supplies market by the tie, if
another company wanted to enter the machinery market, there
would be fewer supplies sellers available to its potential customers;
it, too, would have a greater need to enter on both levels. Therefore,
the tying arrangement would diminish the likelihood that the seller
would have competition from new entrants in either market. 5
3. Effect on Buyers (Coercion)
The third traditional evil of tying arrangements is that they
force purchases on a buyer who might either prefer to take the tied
product from another seller or not to purchase that second product
13. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 399-403 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (tying arrangements may also foreclose seller's competitors for the tying product).
Accord, P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW 733e (1978).
14. 258 U.S. 451 (1922). Additional facts regarding the company's history, market posi-
tion and leasing practices are found in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32
(1918). See also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509
(1969); id. at 513 (White, J., dissenting).




at all. 16 For example, in Loew's Inc. v. United States, 7 the defen-
dant movie producer-distributors required television stations to
take an entire package of films, rather than to negotiate licenses
only for those films they desired. Thus, in order to get Casablanca,
the station also had to take Tugboat Annie Sails Again. '8 The Court
held that the antitrust laws afford protection to those purchasers
that might want different films from other producers, or might not
want to rent additional films at all. 9
Recent cases, however, suggest that this particular evil is not
enough, by itself, to justify finding a tie-in unlawful. There must be
some injury to competition-to actual or potential competitors-as
well as to the buyer. One source of this narrower view is the latest
Supreme Court tie-in case, United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. 2 The plaintiff had obtained a loan from a subsidi-
ary of U.S. Steel on the condition that the money be used to pur-
chase prefabricated homes from another U.S. Steel subsidiary. In
its first consideration of this case, 2' the Supreme Court held that the
defendant's credit was a separate product from the homes which
would be purchased therewith, and that the tie-in would be unlaw-
ful if the plaintiff could show that the defendant had market power
in the credit (tying product) market. The plaintiff argued that the
defendant's credit was unique, since there was no other lender that
offered money on similar terms. In Fortner II, the Court found that
the defendant did not have such market power-even though there
was no other company willing to lend money on those terms-since
16. "At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing
products." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Accord, United States
v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330
(1962).
17. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
18. Id. at 41-42. This same practice, called "block-booking," has also been condemned
in an earlier case, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948).
See generally Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market":
The Supreme Court on the Structure and Conduct of Mass Media, 32 Vimw. L. Rav. 1249
(1979).
19. Another interest of the buyer that is limited by tie-ins is in having alternative
sources of supply of the tied product, either for diversity, or because the original source may
be cut off by a strike or the like.
20. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner H), noted in Klebaner, Credit Tie-Ins: Where Banks
Stand After The Fortner Decisions, 95 BAN N L.J. 419 (1978).
21. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner
I). Fortner I is discussed in Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a
Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 Sup. CT. Rv. 1; Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CoRNau.L L.
REv. 161-71 (1970); Nelson, Tying Arrangements Reconsidered: A Review of Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 15 ANTIRrusT BuLL. 7 (1970); Comment, Credit As a Tying
Product, 69 COLUM L. REv. 1435 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7,
235-47 (1969); 48 N.C.L. REv. 309 (1970).
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the plaintiff made no showing that other companies in the tying
product market could not have made such loans had they chosen to
do so. There was no showing that these other companies, either
actual competitors or potential entrants, were foreclosed from the
tied product market by the defendant's practices; they had volun-
tarily chosen to forego that market. The Court, therefore, found no
violation of the Sherman Act.
Accepting, as the doctrine of law of the case requires, that there
actually was a tie in this situation, then the Court's analysis in
Fortner II overlooked the fact that, regardless of the lack of foreclo-
sure of competitors, the buyer might have been injured by the tie.
The simple fact was that at the time no other seller offered the
particularly attractive terms of U.S. Steel. The buyer had to take
the defendant's homes to get the credit, although it might have
wanted to buy the homes from someone else, or use the money lent
for an entirely different enterprise.
It is not sufficient to say, as Mr. Justice White argued in dissent
in Fortner 1,22 that had U.S. Steel not lent money to Fortner, he
would not have had the opportunity to use it for anything. In every
tying arrangement, having the tying product facilitates use of the
tied product.? For example, unless the buyers in IBM had taken the
defendant's card tabulating machine, they would have had no need
for the tied cards. Yet the fact that the machines were unavailable
elsewhere-making the defendant the sole source of products com-
patible with the cards-was not only not justification for the tie-in,
but an additional reason for condemning 'it as an unwarranted at-
tempted extension of the defendant's monopoly.
24
There is nothing that requires a seller like U.S. Steel to offer
its credit at all. But once it does decide to offer credit on certain
terms, then, accepting the Fortner I premise that this may be part
of an illegal tying arrangement, it ought not be able to tie that credit
to the purchase of certain other products. Regardless of the exist-
22. 394 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). But see id. at 508-09 (Black, J.).
23. Of course, this observation is particularly true with respect to money (or credit).
24. Another recent example of this narrow view of the target of the injury necessary for
finding a tie-in unlawful is Coniglio v. Highwood Serv., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974). The plaintiff challenged a professional fooiball team's require-
ment that purchasers of regular season tickets (the tying product) also had to purchase tickets
to pre-season games (the tied product). The court, although finding two separate products,
substantial economic power in the tying product market, and a restraint of a not insubstantial
amount of commerce in the tied product market, nonetheless found no violation because no
other professional football team competed with the buyer for ticket sales; hence, there was
no foreclosure of competition. The court dismissed as irrelevant for tying analysis the fact
that the ticket buyer might have used the money spent on exhibition game tickets for another
form of entertainment or might even have put it to a completely different use.
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ence of competition in the tying product market, and regardless of
the attractiveness of one of the products sold by the seller, the buyer
is being forced to take something else which may be less desirable.
This coercion of the buyer, resulting in foreclosure of opportunities
to purchase elsewhere or not at all, should be enough to satisfy the
injury requirement of a tying arrangement.25
4. Some Defenses Recognized by Case Law
Even those lawyers who condemn most tying arrangements rec-
ognize that they occasionally may yield significant benefits to the
parties that outweigh the injuries described above. These benefits
are described in more detail below.26 They are recognized exceptions
to the general judicial proposition that tie-ins only rarely benefit
competition,2 and hence are accepted defenses to the rule of per se
illegality of tie-ins. This Article accepts the premise that certain
exceptions to the general rule are appropriate. Defenses should be
available when the tie-in promotes efficiency and when less restric-
tive alternatives to accomplish those same results are not available.
B. Economic Analysis
Most economists take the view that the per se rule against tying
arrangements is unwise.2s They argue that the leverage theory only
rarely motivates sellers to engage in tie-ins, and that even if it did,
it would rarely be successful; therefore, judicial concern based on
the leverage theory is misplaced. Economists suggest that, instead,
several other objectives motivate sellers entering into tying arrange-
ments which have benign effects on competition. Finally, they argue
that some tie-ins are motivated by efficiency considerations, and
that proscription of these would be harmful to the economy.
This Section will describe the different motivations economists
ascribe to sellers engaging in tying arrangements. The next Section
will suggest why the leverage theory should not be rejected; will
25. The recent case of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979), lends additional
support to the assertion that this injury to consumers is enough to satisfy this requirement.
At issue was whether a consumer who spent more for goods designed for "personal use" than
he otherwise might have, because of unlawful price fixing, could maintain a private treble
damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act. In permitting the suit, the Court rejected
the argument that an injury to "business or property" required an injury of a commercial or
business nature. Similarly, in Coniglio, see note 24 supra, the football fan's spending a greater
sum to buy season tickets, and that in Fortner the home builder's spending more for prefabri-
cated homes than he otherwise would have, was injurious, regardless of the existence and
hence the foreclosure of actual or potential competitors.
26. See text accompanying notes 152-63 infra.
27. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Baldwin & McFarland, supra note 4, at 438 (citing other economists).
19801
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discuss why even the other objectives ascribed to sellers are not as
benign as argued; and will accept, although in somewhat limited
form, the suggested procompetitive objectives of tie-ins.
The seller that has a certain amount of monopoly power" in one
product can have two objectives in its pricing decisions for that
product. First, even a monopolist has difficulty in extracting the full
potential monopoly profit from its product; it will want to adjust its
marketing techniques to increase that profit. Then, it may want to
use its market power to obtain not only the full monopoly profit
from that product, but may also want to use the "leverage" of that
power to obtain some profits in another product market as well.
Tying arrangements may be useful devices to achieve both of these
goals. If the tie is used for the first objective, it will be deemed a
"revenue maximizing device"; if it is used for the second objective,
it will be deemed a "monopoly creating device."3
Many economists argue that tie-ins can be used only rarely as
a monopoly creating device.31 Even the seller with a "true monop-
oly"-the seller with 100% of sales in the relevant market-cannot
change prices without suffering some loss of sales. Before the impo-
sition of a tying arrangement, it will already have set its price at the
level at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Even though
an increase in price may increase revenue per unit, at that point
there will be a sufficiently large fall-off in total amount demanded
that net profits will decrease. What happens when a tie-in is
imposed? If the tied product represents something that the buyer
does not want, or that is priced higher than its value to the buyer,
the buyer will treat it as an increase in the price of the tying prod-
uct. The economist posits, therefore, that in most cases any increase
in the profits realized on the tied product will be completely offset
by the loss of profits on the tying product.2
To summarize-many economists argue that a seller can never
get more than the monopoly price for the tying product. If buyers
29. In this context, monopoly means only that the seller faces a meaningfully downward
sloping demand curve. Thus, the price it sets will affect the amount that consumers will buy,
and it has the option to set its price higher than its marginal costs.
30. These are the labels used in Professor Bowman's seminal article, Bowman, Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
31. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (1976);
Baldwin & McFarland, Tying Arrangements in Law and Economics, 8 ANTITRusT BULL. 743,
766, 778 (1963); Bowman, supra note 30; Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw.
U.L. REV. 62 (1960). See also R. BORK, THE ANTRusT PARADox 365-81 (1978).
32. This approach was used by the Court in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co.,
247 U.S. 32, 65 (1918), to uphold tying arrangements in the defendant's lease provisions.
Economists believe that deviation from this analysis, in favor of alternate explanations of tie-
ins, is the source of the assertedly inappropriate rules applied today.
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really want the tying product, they will pay up to the monopoly
price to obtain it. If the tied product is undesired, those buyers will
not pay any more for the tying product than before, or will not pay
more for the tied product than what it is worth (the competitive
price). 3 All the tying arrangement can do is reduce the price of the
tying product and raise the price of the tied product, leaving the
combined price no more than it would have been absent the tie.
Economists therefore argue that the leverage theory is an inade-
quate explanation for tie-ins." Since the case law is based on this
analysis of tie-ins, and since this kind of conduct rarely occurs, they
argue that the per se rule is inappropriate.
The other justifications for tying arrangements are more widely
accepted.35 Sellers wish to capture the largest possible share of the
total profit which at least theoretically inheres in the tying product.
The seller's inability to reap this hypothetical maximum profit sim-
ply by adjusting its price is the result of two related phenomena.
First, as to each individual buyer (and for all buyers in the aggre-
gate), the demand curve is usually negatively sloped; this simply
means that the buyer is willing to pay more for the first unit of
something than he would pay for the second, and then more for that
than the third, and so on. However, normal marketing techniques
require that the tenth unit be sold at the same price as the first.
Unless the seller can somehow charge more for the earlier units-to
take advantage of the higher marginal utility of those units to the
buyer-there is said to be "consumer's surplus" in the transaction. 36
Second, some buyers derive different utilities from a product than
other buyers. This simply means that some buyers would pay
twenty dollars for the same first (or tenth) unit for which others
would pay no more than ten dollars. It states the obvious, however,
33. See Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 626, 632-
34 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 30, at 29-36 (per se rule particularly inappropriate
in patent combination cases); Burstein, supra note 31 (but per se rule may nonetheless be
appropriate).
35. The economic analysis of these different seller objectives is exhaustively covered in
Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967).
36. Consumer's surplus is the difference between the total utility of all units pur-
chased-the amount the consumer would have paid for all units-and the amount actually
paid. See P. SAMuELSON, ECONoMics 438-40 (10th ed. 1976).
Professor Stigler offers a variation of this goal as an explanation for the desire of movie
producer-distributors to offer packages of films to television stations. He argues that the
practice enabled the licensors to take account of the different relative values put on each film
in the package by individual stations, when a uniform price on each film separately would
yield lower revenues either because the total of the separate prices would be lower, or because
certain stations would not take the films at higher prices. Stigler, United States v. Loew's
Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 152.
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to say that any price over ten dollars will lose some sales. The seller
would want to structure its pricing system so that it can make both
sales and still obtain the full utility value ascribed to the goods by
each seller. The seller simply wishes to engage in price discrimina-
tion .
37
One effective technique for capturing the consumer's surplus or
effecting price discrimination is to impose tying arrangements. The
seller will obtain a share of the consumer's surplus if it charges a
lower price than might otherwise prevail on the tying product, while
at the same time charging a higher price on the tied product,
changes in the demand for which will be less sensitive to changes
in the price. 8
Economists assert that the most frequent objective of tying
arrangements is to effect price discrimination. These arrangements
are designed to extract the full marginal utility ascribed to the tying
product by different purchasers by using a separate tied product as
a "counting device." The seller charges less than the full monopoly
price on the tying product, and charges a super-normal price for the
tied product, which is sold in varying quantities to different buyers.
The implementation of this technique is best illustrated by the facts
of International Salt Co. v. United States.
39
The defendant in that case had patents for machines which
would simplify the injection of salt into food products. Food canners
would have to purchase salt somewhere, regardless of whether they
used the defendant's machine. Assume that a company would have
to spend one dollar per thousand cans of food for the labor involved
in injecting the necessary ten pounds of salt if it did not have defen-
dant's machine, and only seventy-five cents per thousand cans if it
had the use of those machines. Under those facts, the food processor
would be willing to spend almost up to twenty-five cents for every
thousand cans it manufactures to rent the defendant's salt injecting
machine, since any price below twenty-five cents would save it
money. Furthermore, it would not matter if this twenty-five cents
fee were levied on the machine alone or on some combination of
lower price of the machine and higher price for salt, as long as the
67. This kind of price discrimination is unrelated to the kind of conduct covered by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). Here, price discrimination simply means sales
at prices matched to the utility put on the goods or services by different buyers.
38. For a detailed discussion of the use of tying arrangements to implement a strategy
of capturing a share of the consumer's surplus for the seller, see Burstein, supra note 31, at
74-77; Edwards, Economics of "Tying" Arrangements: Some Proposed Guidelines for Bank
Holding-Company Regulation, 6 AwrrrausT LAW & ECON. REV. 87, 89-95 (1973); Markovits,
supra note 35, at 1399-1443.
39. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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total was something less than twenty-five cents per thousand cans.
Now further assume that there are two such food processors. Arti-
choke manufactures one million cans per month, while Broccoli
manufactures only 500,000 per month. The saving to Artichoke, if
it uses defendant's machine, is $250 per month, while that to Broc-
coli is only $125 per month. Any rental charge over $125 per month
will lose Broccoli's business; any charge under $250 will fail to cap-
ture for the lessor the full marginal utility of the machine to Arti-
choke. Ideally, the lessor would then base the rental fee on the
machine's use by, or marginal utility to, the buyer. However, this
may not be possible, perhaps because Broccoli would rent the ma-
chine from the lessor for $125 and then sublease it to Artichoke
(arbitrage), or perhaps because it is difficult for the lessor to calcu-
late in advance the use of the machine, and hence an appropriate
rental price. Another alternative is for the lessor to rent the machine
at a nominal price-or even allow its free use-on the condition that
the lessee use the defendant's salt in connection with the machine.
Thus, in our example, both Artichoke and Broccoli would be better
off paying up to a fraction less than two and one-half cents per
pound above the prevailing market price for salt if they had free use
of defendant's machine. 0 The economist would argue that the de-
fendant is getting no more in total return than it would get from
charging the full monopoly price on the machine and charging the
competitive market price for the tied goods. The tying arrangement
is being used merely to facilitate a form of price discrimination by
the seller. Since the buyer pays no more for the package, so the
argument runs, no one is harmed by the tying arrangement.
The conclusion supposedly to be drawn from this analysis is
that tying arrangements that are used as revenue maximizing de-
vices do not alter the competitive relationship between producers;
they simply shift resources from one group (consumers) to another
group (producers). Since there is nothing that "entitles" consumers
to obtain the goods and services at lower prices, there is nothing
wrong, the economists argue, in this particular marketing strategy.
In fact, it might be argued that in some situations, this use of tying
arrangements is societally beneficial, since it may increase the total
availability of goods and services. Assume, for example, a tie that
is used as a counting device to effect price discrimination among
buyers with different utilities for the tying product. For a variety of
reasons, more direct counting methods may be undesirable or even
40. Any other combination of machine rental and extra salt charge, adding up to a
fraction less than 2.5¢, would yield the same result.
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unfeasible." If tie-ins were not available the seller might charge all
users a somewhat higher price for the tying product-the price
which maximizes the return on that product taken alone-thereby
resulting in a lower net usage of that product than would exist with
the tie.
42
Economists assert that tying arrangements may be imple-
mented for other reasons as well. The ties can be methods of avoid-
ing constraints on raising the price of the tying product. These may
be the result of government-imposed price ceilings;43 of a temporary
"gray market" situation, when the seller feels it cannot gouge its
customers but when it would still like to take advantage of the
demand for its product; or of an oligopoly pricing situation, when
price changes will quickly be matched by the few other sellers. The
tying product will be sold at the appropriate "maximum," but its
true "market value" will be captured by forcing the buyer to pur-
chase another product at a higher price, which reflects the difference
between that maximum and the true market value.
Tying arrangements may also be imposed for reasons less di-
rectly related to price and profit maximization. The seller may be
concerned that the failure to use certain related products with its
tying product will cause customer dissatisfaction. For example, the
manufacturer of a machine may fear that low quality supplies will
cause the machine to malfunction, or that the purchase of low qual-
ity goods by a retail customer from one franchisee will impair the
reputation for quality of the franchisor's trademark. Therefore, to
maintain the goodwill of its tying product the seller may require
that its own tied products be used in connection with the tying
product."
Finally, it may be cheaper to sell the two products as a unit,
41. For example, the user of the tying product will not know in advance its precise
volume of usage; because most businesses are risk avoiders, they will be unwilling to pay as
much for future uncertain use as they would for present actual use. Alternatively the seller
may fear that the purchasers will use fraudulent devices to underreport the volume of use of
the tying product. See Burstein, supra note 31, at 69-72; Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and
Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 552, 555-56 (1965); Markovits,
supra note 35, at 1444.
42. In this situation-where absent a tie-in the seller would not use other counting
devices, and so fewer tying products would be sold-there might be injury to some would-be
buyers and to society in general. This is a frequently cited example of the procompetitive
effects of tie-ins. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 31, at 375; Baldwin & McFarland, supra note
31, at 745; Burstein, supra note 31, at 69-72; Edwards, supra note 38, at 102-05; Ferguson,
supra note 41; Markovits, supra note 35, at 1444.
43. See, e.g., Coffin-Redington Co. v. Porter, 156 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1946). The use of
tie-ins to evade price "floors" is suggested in Edwards, supra note 38, at 96-97.
44. The existence of these benefits is the premise for the goodwill and business justifica-
tion defenses, discussed in text accompanying notes 152-63, 196-97 infra.
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either because of economies of scale or particular technological re-
quirements. Regardless of whether this cost savings is passed along
partially or entirely to the buyer in the form of a lower price for the
two product "package" or is retained by the seller, economic advan-
tages result to at least one of the parties to the transaction from
these tie-ins.45
C. Synthesis of the Two Approaches
The economist's view is that the courts have based a per se rule
on an unrealistic appraisal of the motivations for, and effects of,
tying arrangements. They argue that since using tying arrange-
ments as monopoly creating devices is not feasible the concerns
about leverage are illusory. Next, the economists assert that the
revenue-maximization objective is competitively neutral, since eco-
nomics does not make any value judgment about who should have
the "consumer's surplus" or the full marginal utility of the tying
product-the buyer or the seller."
This Article differs in several respects. First, it argues that the
use of the leverage of the tying product's market power to obtain
some monopoly power in the tied product market in fact does occur
in some situations, and that this practice should be of concern under
the antitrust laws. Second, even the revenue-maximizing type of
tie-in can have anticompetitive effects. Third, although economics
may claim itself to be a "value-free" system, one can make social
or political judgments that it is desirable to maximize the distribu-
tion of surplus to the buyers rather than to sellers. Finally, the two
objectives of tying arrangements 7 are not neatly differentiated;
rather, most sellers who engage in tie-ins will be seeking some com-
bination of these two goals. Not only will problems of proof be
significant, but there will be little benefit from making this distinc-
tion. Therefore, continuation of the per se approach for all types of
45. It has been suggested that tie-ins maybe of some benefit to purchasers, for example,
to assure them of high quality complementary products, to take advantage of a seller's
advertising of an entire range of products, or to enable them to take advantage of quantity
discounts. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis.
L. REV. 88, 99. It should be obvious, however, that the tie-in itself offers none of these
advantages. The buyer is presumably free to buy both products, even absent the tie. If the
buyer wished to have the tied product as well as the tying product to reap these advantages,
no compulsion or coercion would be necessary. The tie-in, then, by definition, is necessary
because the seller fears that, absent the compulsion, the buyer would not take the tied
product.
46. There is considerably less disagreement between lawyers and economists on the
appropriateness of certain efficiency exceptions or defenses. Any disagreement that does arise
is on the definition and breadth of these exceptions.
47. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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tying arrangements is appropriate.
Although some would argue that tie-ins can only rarely be used
to extend monopoly power to a second product, economists agree
that this leverage effect does occur occasionally. 8 This objective will
most frequently prevail when (1) the two products are used in vary-
ing proportions; (2) the demands for them are complementary, so
that a reduction in the price of the tying product will not only
increase demand for it, but will also increase demand for the tied
product, even if its price stays unchanged;49 and (3) the seller has
substantial market power in the tying product market, but there is
sufficiently vigorous competition in the tied product market that
the seller would have no ability to control prices there.( When these
conditions are present a seller would be willing to take a lower price
and, assuming the amount demanded does not increase sufficiently,
a lower profit, in the tying product market, if those reduced profits
would be more than offset by increase of profits in the tied product
market. Given the vigorous competition in the tied product market,
however, the seller has no way of insuring, absent the tie, that the
lower tying product price will yield it-rather than its competi-
tors-the increased share in the tied product market. The tying
arrangement, however, can give the seller this control in both mar-
kets. Under these conditions, regardless of the price the seller could
have set for the tying product, the total profit realized with the tie
will indeed be greater than the seller could have obtained on the
tying product alone. 51
Another objection to the economists' challenge to the leverage
theory is that it ignores the fact that there may be foreclosure of
competitors even if the seller is not attempting to obtain a
48. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 31, at 20,.32; Burstein, supra note 31, at 67-68 n.21,
94; Edwards, supra note 38, at 97-98. See also In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F.
Supp. 393, 399-403 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (tying arrangements may also foreclose seller's competitors
for the tying product); P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 733e (1978).
49. An example would be the demands for coffee and sugar. In contrast, when products
are substitutes-coffee and tea-a rise in the price of one will increase sales of the other, even
if the second product's price stays constant.
50. E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 190-95 (1968); Baldwin & McFarland, supra note
31, at 769. The cases generally provide little economic analysis to distinguish the various
motives for tie-ins. In United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 560-61 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961), the court suggested that the defendant was
unlawfully using the tie-in in an attempt to make monopoly profits in the tied product
market, beyond what it could have obtained solely by adjusting its price in the tying product
market, in which it admittedly had a monopoly. The court held that the defendant had to
reap its profits solely from raising prices of the tying product, while recognizing that this
would yield a lower total return.
51. See Bowman, supra note 30, at 25 & n.18.
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"monopoly" 5 2 position in the tied product market. Competition will
be injured even if the seller is simply trying to increase the percen-
tage of sales it would make in that arguably competitive market,
beyond those it would have made if it could not rely on a tie . 3 Even
if the seller is getting no more than the competitive price for the tied
product, it is making that sale. The seller is assured of an outlet for
an additional product because of the tie. In view of the large expen-
ses that companies undertake for marketing and advertising, having
this captive market without undergoing these expenses and without
taking the risk that the sale will not be made is certainly of some
value. Since the economist defines costs to include a fair return on
capital," getting the "competitive" price still means that the com-
pany is making at least a "normal" profit. If the seller does not have
to incur the marketing costs, it probably will be getting at least
some greater than "normal" profit.
After challenging the leverage or monopoly-extension theory,
many economists argue that because the three principal objectives
of tying arrangements-maximization of consumer's surplus, price
discrimination and avoidance of price restraints on the tying prod-
uct-do not foreclose competing sellers, the rule holding all tie-ins
to be per se unlawful is inappropriate. They argue that an examina-
tion of the defendant's motives is required, and that tie-ins should
be condemned, if at all, only when the defendant's intent, and the
effect of its conduct, is shown to be anticompetitive.
Numerous responses can be offered to this assertion-(1) Even
tie-ins designed solely for revenue maximization may improperly
foreclose competitors and hence injure competition; (2) A buyer
52. One source of this disagreement between lawyers and economists is the definition
of "leverage." Economists apply the term only when the tie is used as a monopoly-creating
device; the use of the tie for revenue maximization is not thought to be a use of "leverage."
See Bowman, supra note 30; text accompanying note 30 supra. Since monopoly in the tied
product market means the seller is getting more than a competitive price, economists seem-
ingly imply that a sale made at the competitive price is no different than no sale at all. As
the text suggests, the assurance of making such a sale is in fact something to which the seller
is hardly indifferent and which furthermore may have important competitive significance.
53. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,396-97 (1947) and Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1958), defendants argued that their competitors
were not foreclosed, and buyers not injured, because the tying contracts expressly allowed
the buyers to go elsewhere if the defendants' competitors offered lower prices for the tied
products. Yet, it is obvious that by merely matching those prices the defendants would
guarantee themselves 100% of the sales to the particular buyers; this assured share is prefera-
ble to competition for an uncertain share. Therefore, in both cases the Court properly dis-
missed this alleged absence of buyer injury as an inadequate defense. Accord, Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512-13 nn.3, 5 (1969) (White, J.,
dissenting).
54. Burstein, supra note 31, at 66 n.16.
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that is deprived of the free choice of whether or from whom to
purchase a second product often suffers significant injury; (3) It is
not unimportant whether resources are distributed to the seller or
to the buyer; (4) The seller's motives are neither clear nor unalloyed;
it may be difficult to determine the seller's objectives since it may
be seeking monopoly extension as well as revenue maximization; (5)
Even if it is true that tie-ins in this second category usually d6 not
injure competition, they also yield few, if any, benefits to competi-
tion. For these five reasons as well as for considerations of deterrence
and judicial economy, continued application of a per se rule to this
conduct is appropriate.
First, as suggested earlier, even assuming a seller is getting
nothing more than a "competitive price" for its product, it is not
ambivalent about making a sale. Even if all of the monopoly profit
is attributable to the tying product, it is not irrelevant to the seller
that it is also making a normal profit on the tied product. For
example, even if the International Salt Company could reap no
monopoly profits on its salt from the tying arrangement" -the
buyers were paying no more than the value of the salt injecting
machine-the simple fact was that without any marketing or adver-
tising expenses, and without incurring the risk or uncertainty fac-
tors from being unable to forecast future demands, this seller knew
that it had a captive market, and that its competitors could not take
these sales away from it. Thus, if foreclosure is defined as the inabil-
ity of prospective sellers to compete on equal terms, then the clear
effect of the arrangement is market foreclosure. "
A second effect of all tie-ins is the deprivation of the buyer's free
choice. Many economists argue that this simply does not occur-the
buyer is simply paying more for the tied product, because it is
getting a lower price on the tying product. The buyer will never pay
more for the two products than their combined value. Even if this
is true, the buyer may still have his purchasing decisions distorted
55. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
56. Some economists suggest that foreclosure of competitors could not have been the
defendant's intent, since the salt subject to the tie-in was only a very small percentage of
total salt sales. They argue that the leverage theory is discredited by the fact that this small
share could not possibly allow the seller to obtain a monopoly in the tied product market.
See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 31, at 176; Pearson, supra note 33, at 637 (foreclosure is de
minimis and hence an inadequate basis for per se rule). Yet, the same practice would work,
as in United Shoe Machinery, when sales of supplies might be a far larger percentage of the
total market. Regardless of defendant's motive, and regardless of the percentage of market
foreclosed, the fact is that the effect of the arrangement was some foreclosure. Furthermore,
although it is true that the seller may not obtain a tied product monopoly in the Sherman §




by the tie-in. The football ticket cases57 prove a useful example.
Certain professional football teams required the purchaser of seven
regular season tickets to purchase three exhibition game tickets as
well, each ticket being sold for the price of ten dollars.58 Assume a
fan who would value the regular season game tickets at twelve dol-
lars, and the exhibition game tickets at six dollars. The economist
would argue that since he values the total package of ten tickets at
$102, he is really better off by being forced to buy all ten at a total
of $100. But is he? He values the regular season tickets at eighty-
four dollars, and may be fully satisfied with watching only those
games.5 He might want to use the additional sixteen dollars to buy
57. Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio
v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (discussed
in note 24 supra); Laing v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 59 (D. Minn.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 492 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974); Grossman
Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas. 95,538 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd mem., 503
F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974); Pfeiffer v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 1973-1 Trade
Cas. 93,265 (D. Mass. 1972); Rubin v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., Civ. No. 74-129-Civ.-CA (S.D.
Fla. filed May 22, 1974).
58. The cases make no attempt to identify, from an economic perspective, why the
defendants engaged in this conduct. They seem to be classic illustrations of the leverage
theory-using the more desirable regular season tickets to sell the less desired exhibition
tickets. Even if they are no more than a form of price discrimination, however, the illustra-
tions in this note and the text will show that they not only can increase the total revenues of
the team, but can also injure both the football fan and the team's competitors for the fan's
disposable income.
Using the assumption that each ticket-the seven regular season and the three presea-
son-costs $10, let us further assume that the stadium has 50,000 seats. The total season
revenue will be $5 million. The team management, acting as rational sellers, will have priced
the tickets at the profit-maximizing level; this means that any increase in price will result in
such a large decrease in purchases that the net total revenues will fall. Since the team is
interested in total season revenues, it will take a somewhat lower price on regular season
tickets if it can make up this amount by greater sales of exhibition game tickets.
Now assume that the exhibition games have a sufficient diminished attraction that only
30,000 fans would attend at $10 a ticket, if there were no tie-in. The economist would then
argue that the reason all 50,000 fans buy the tickets is that as to the other 20,000, the regular
season tickets are truly worth more than $10, and they are allocating some of the exhibition
game ticket price to the regular season ticket. But if the regular season tickets were then
priced at this "true value"-which may be $12-and were not made the subject of a tie-in,
total sales might fall to only 47,000 tickets, since 3,000 fans might feel that no games are worth
the additional $2. Furthermore, at the $12 price, the team might only sell 25,000 exhibition
tickets. As a result, its net season revenue has dropped to $4,848,000 (7 games x $12 x 47,000
plus 3 games x $12 x 25,000). Other combinations of prices and fan preferences would also
yield lower total net revenues.
The mathematics would be arbitrary, based on the demand curves one would hypothe-
size. Nevertheless, the use of a tie-in allows the seller to sell its entire product, at a greater
total net revenue, by engaging in a form of price discrimination than it could have done if it
had to deal with all buyers based on their varying preferences for the different products.
59. The economist might argue that if the exhibition game tickets are worth $6 to that
fan, he would be equally well off either watching those games, or selling the tickets for that
price. This, however, fails to recognize that others in the marketplace may not value the
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hockey tickets, or go to a movie, or perhaps even put that money in
a savings account. 0 While forcing him to buy all ten tickets argua-
bly gives him greater net "economic utility" for his money, it none-
theless distorts the spending decisions from those that would have
prevailed absent the tie.6
Third, the fact that certain forms of tying arrangements might
not shift any resources among competing producers, but will merely
shift them between sellers and buyers, is nonetheless not irrelevant
for antitrust purposes. Economic explanations are said to be value-
free; the distribution of resources among buyers and sellers, pro-
vided there is no increase or dimunition in total societal resources,
is a concern that economists need not address.2 The legal system
ought not be equally value-free. 3 This Article not only proceeds on
tickets even at $6, so he may find no buyers; or, even if the "market price" for the exhibition
tickets is more than $6, and he could sell them, the fan will incur additional transaction costs,
such as identifying the potential buyers and consummating the sales.
60. Although the court in Coniglio rejected the plaintiff's argument that his other
entertainment options were foreclosed-by finding these other choices not to be a part of the
"relevant market," 495 F.2d at 1293-it is difficult to understand why the other sport teams
in the city might not have been foreclosed by defendant's practices. Furthermore, if one
admits that the tie does foreclose the buyer from making some other use of his money, why
should it be significant that the alternative is in some other "relevant market," or even that
it may be difficult to identify just what the choices were?
61. Another example of this narrow approach is Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
444 F. Supp. 648, 673-75 (D.S.C. 1977), affl'd, 594 F.2d 979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3431 (1980). In a reversal of the normal pattern of patent/tie-in cases-in which
the patented product is the tying product and the buyer is required to take unpatented
products, see, e.g., cases cited in note 1 supra-here the defendant required buyers to take a
license on its patents in order to obtain the defendant's unpatented machines. In holding this
tying arrangement lawful, the court said that since no competitors could have been foreclosed
from offering the patented tied products, there could be no restraint of commerce in that
market. This analysis fails, however, to measure the potential injury to the plaintiff-buyers.
They might have wanted only the unpatented tying product and not the tied products. Yet,
because of the tying arrangement, they were required to take both, perhaps increasing their
costs or at least allowing the defendants to engage in price discrimination.
62. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETTION, COOR-
DINATION AND CONTROL 40 (2d ed. 1977); Burstein, supra note 31, at 89 n.71; Edwards, supra
note 38, at 101-02.
63. Professor Markovits includes among the objectives of tie-ins the concealment of the
seller's contract or tax fraud. He notes that the seller "could use other methods of obscuring
his actual sales of and profits on [the tying product], but the tie-in may increase the
probability that [the seller's] fraud will not be detected by providing him with invoices to
substantiate his bookkeeping entries." Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity,. and the Leverage
Theory Part 1k. Tie-ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws, 80 YAM L.J. 195, 229
(1970). Yet even this fact does not seem to persuade him that tying arrangements ought to
be unlawful under the antitrust laws, although he concedes that such conduct "may be void
under the common law of contracts as contra bones [sic] mores." Id. at 196, n.2. It should
not be surprising that others may conclude that although the antitrust laws are principally
designed to promote competition, it is not inconsistent with this assertion to say that they
are appropriate vehicles for dealing with undesirable conduct for noncompetitive reasons as
well.
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the premise that it is not of negligible concern whether profit max-
imization goes to the seller or to the buyer; it makes the explicit
value judgment that, all other things being equal, the buyers' inter-
ests ought to prevail. For example, there is no need to be equivocal
about tie-ins used to evade governmental price ceilings on the tying
product, even if they cause no adverse impact on competition.
Therefore, if it is asserted that the principal objective of tying ar-
rangements is to achieve this shifting of resources effect, this in
itself might be sufficient grounds to hold all tying arrangements
unlawful.
Fourth, the objectives of tying arrangements are often inter-
mingled and, in any event, will be difficult to identify. In many
cases, sellers will adopt tying arrangements for a variety of reasons
rather than just one. Even if the defendant's intent is to use the tie-
in solely for revenue-maximization, it may nonetheless also have a
monopoly creating effect. For example, the assertion that tying ar-
rangements are used principally to achieve price discrimina-
tion-that they are merely convenient counting devices-fails to
explain a number of the franchising tie-ins. If the franchisor is not
sure how successful the outlet will be, so that it does not want to
charge a flat franchise fee, it may want to collect its royalties indi-
rectly, by charging a supernormal price for ancillary products.64 But,
could this not be done effectively by tying one product or group of
products? It does not explain why the seller insists on tying sales to
a large number of different tied products, often including equipment
or the lease of real property as well as supplies consumed in varying
volumes. The fact that the buyers are required to take this host of
tied products suggests that the seller is not merely trying to maxim-
ize profits in the tying product market; it is also trying to extend
its monopoly into a number of additional markets . 5 The existence
of this possibility as one of the seller's goals is not diminished by
the fact that the franchisor often does not manufacture the tied
products; the commission it gets on those sales is equally effective
to allow it to capture its supernormal profits.
Furthermore, proof of the seller's principal or exclusive motiva-
tion will often be exceedingly difficult." The examination of motives
will involve conflicting testimony by expert witnesses, which the
court (and even more so a jury) simply cannot evaluate satisfacto-
64. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
65. In fact, Professor Burstein concedes that at least some tie-in cases are best ex-
plained by an extension of monopoly theory. Burstein, supra note 31, at 67 n.21, 82 n.51.
66. Bowman, supra note 30, at 35-36.
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rily. In response to the defendant's assertions that its goals were
competitively benign, the plaintiff will have to resort to economic
models to show that the defendant's conduct could have, or did
have, leverage effects in the tied product market. Mere contempla-
tion of this process suggests that the net result of this attempted
examination of the defendant's intent will be quite unsatisfactory.
Finally, the best that defenders of tying arrangements can offer
is that they usually have no anticompetitive effects . 7 Aside from the
specific defenses to be discussed below, there are few economic effi-
ciencies that can be identified." This, then, is the ideal situation for
application of a per se rule. Perhaps the dispute can be distilled to
a question of presumptions or of burden of proof. For example,
Professor Markovits rejects the per se rule against tying arrange-
ments because "[t]he Court has simply failed to justify its conclu-
sion that the inevitable (or the exclusive) function of tie-ins is to
reduce competition in the tied-product market." 9 This discussion
suggests that tying arrangements can have a wide variety of adverse
economic and societal consequences. But, even accepting his asser-
tion, this does not destroy the vitality of the per se rule.
There are numerous advantages of a per se approach. Stating
that the conduct is always unlawful will save considerable judicial
resources in evaluating the alleged reasonableness of the particular
conduct. There will be greater predictability and hence greater de-
terrence. There will be diminished likelihood that improper conduct
will be permitted to continue. 70 Per se rules are appropriate when
the courts have examined numerous instances of the conduct in
question, and have reached the conclusion that continued reexami-
nation will not yield situations in which the conduct should be
permitted to continue. With the exception of Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.71 and Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 72 the Supreme Court has sustained challenges
to tying arrangements in all cases decided by full opinion. 73 Since
in my view Fortner II was improperly decided and Times-Picayune
67. The example most frequently offered is the use of tie-ins as counting devices. If the
direct imposition of varying royalty payments would be lawful, it is argued that the practice
ought not be unlawful when it is done in another, indirect manner. Although this method
may be more convenient for the seller, it is not so clear that it yields efficiencies or cost
savings, and it runs the risk of adversely affecting competition.
68. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 156 (1977). See also Ferguson,
supra note 41, at 564 (economist approving per se rule).
69. Markovits, supra note 63, at 205 (emphasis added).
70. See note 9 supra.
71. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
72. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
73. See note 1 supra.
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may be otherwise explained," the per se rule respecting tying ar-
rangements should be restated and even expanded.
7 5
An analogy may be drawn to the rule of price fixing. Price fixing
is unreasonable per se, even though this form of conduct may not
always injure competition.76 That rule is justified because price fix-
ing often injures competition; it never benefits competition; and it
is simply not a worthwhile expenditure of judicial resources to sepa-
rate out the injurious from the benign. Similarly, having shown that
tie-ins often injure competition, why must one go further to show
that they always injure competition, if the defenders of this conduct
can come forward with only slight justifications for allowing the
conduct to continue, other than the specific benefits which the rule
argued for in this Article would recognize as defenses? On the other
hand, if the rule argued for by the economists-requiring individual
examination of the effects of each tie-in-were accepted, the sellers'
hope of persuading the trier of fact of their benign intentions would
lead to expansion of tying arrangments.
Having concluded that the per se rule for tying arrangements
is sound, and that the attempted defense of this conduct by econo-
mists is inadequate, this Article will next proceed to examine the
standards created by courts for evaluating tie-ins. After examining
the present separate tests for showing the existence and then the
illegality of tie-ins, the Article will suggest that this approach is
unnecessarily complicated and gives rise to needless confusion. The
Article will then conclude with a proposal for a simplified approach
to tie-ins, combining the issues of existence and liability.
III. PRESENT CASE LAW
A. Existence of a Tie-in
1. One or two products?
Analytically, the first step in any tying analysis must be
whether the sale consisted of two separate products or whether the
74. See the criticism of this case at notes 136-45 infra, and accompanying text. The
other Supreme Court decision upholding a tying arrangement, Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), can be explained both on the ground that the Court found
that the sale involved only "one product," and hence there could be no tie-in, see discussion
at notes 79-82 infra, and accompanying text, and also that the standard for illegality is one
which has been modified by the Court since that decision, see note 131 infra and accompany-
ing text.
75. Solomon, An Analysis of Tying Arrangements: The Offer You Can't Refuse, 26
MERCER L. REv. 547 (1975).
76. National Soc. of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); United States




"package sale" ought to be viewed as that of a larger, single product.
It is tautological that there can be no tie-in if there is a sale of only
one product. The cases often give the illustrations that there is
no tie-in if a store insists that the customer purchase a right shoe
in order to get the left one, or if an automobile dealer requires a
customer to take tires with her new car. Yet, although there have
been a number of cases 77 in which the presence of two separate
products was a key issue, and despite a number of suggested tests
in the legal literature, 7 there is still no satisfactory standard for
evaluating this key question.
Much of the blame can be laid on the Supreme Court. In the
two cases in which this issue arose, Times-Picayune Publishing Co.
v. United States71 and Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp.,0 not only did the Court fail to articulate a clear test,
but even worse the Court treated the "one product versus two prod-
uct" question as a defense to what would be an otherwise unlawful
tie-in, rather than as an essential prerequisite to the very existence
of a tying arrangement.
In Times-Picayune, the Government challenged a requirement
by a newspaper publisher that persons wishing to place an adver-
tisement in its morning newspaper also had to place the advertise-
ment in the evening paper. The Court's opinion devoted six pages
to a discussion of standards of legality, the effect of the arrangement
77. See, e.g., Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928, 931-33 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d
1207, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1977), on remand, 1979-1 Trade Cas. 77,991, 77,992 (D.Ore. 1979);
Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1345 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1097 (1977); Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
252-53 (4th Cir. 1971); Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 759-66 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965); Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota
Dist., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 973, 981-86 (D. Mass. 1979); Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 1979-2
Trade Cas. 78,779 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 77,702,
77,703-04 (E.D. Va. 1979); Johnson v. Nationwide Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 948, 951 (N.D.
Ill. 1978); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 230-34 (N.D. Cal.
1978); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 501 (D. Del. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Austin, supra note 45, at 116-18; Pearson, supra note 33, at 627-30; Ross,
The Single Product Issue in Antitrust Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORy L.J. 963
(1974); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAMY. L.
REv. 50, 68-72 (1958); Wheeler, Some Observations on Tie-ins, The Single Product Defense,
Exclusive Dealing and Regulated Industries, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1557 (1972);.Note, Tying
Arrangements and the Single Product Issue, 31 OIo ST. L.J. 861 (1970); Note, Product
Separability: A Workable Standard to Identify Tie-In Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 160 (1972); 85 HARV. L. REv. 670, 674-79 (1972).
79. 345 U.S. 594 (1953); see Note, Definition of the Market in Tying Arrangements:
Another Aspect of Times-Picayune, 63 YAtE L.J. 389 (1954).
80. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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on competition, and so forth,8' before finally stating that the sale of
advertising in the morning and afternoon newspapers constituted
only one product.82
In Fortner I, the key issue that split the five Justice majority
and the four Justice dissent was whether credit (the alleged tying
product) was a separate product from the goods sold on credit (the
alleged tied product). Yet, once again, not only did the Court first
devote nine pages to discussion of the standards of legality before
reaching this key preliminary issue, 3 but then it again failed to take
the opportunity to offer a clear test for making this determination. 4
In fairness, however, the Court is not entirely responsible for
the prevailing confusion. The definition of the relevant unitary
product for tie-in purposes depends on a number of factors. It would
be inappropriate for this Article to deal with these issues in great
detail and then offer yet another general test. The standards sug-
gested in the cases and in the literature are useful beginnings.
Courts should look at the prevailing practice by which the prod-
uct(s) is sold industry-wide; whether the products are sold in fixed
or variable quantities; whether there is some cost savings or other
efficiency in selling the product(s) together; the practical functions
served by selling the items in a package; and the motive of the seller
in choosing this method of distribution. 5 One hopes that, at the
81. 345 U.S. at 605-12.
82. Id. at 613-14. This conclusion must then render the entire prior discussion pure
dictum. Curiously, although the Court had stressed that the market which the defendant
allegedly dominated was advertising, not readership (or circulation), id. at 610, in reaching
the conclusion that the product sold was advertising generally rather than separate advertise-
ments in separate newspapers, the Court relied on the assumption that advertisers (the
"purchasers") were primarily concerned with fungible readers, and "that the readership
'bought' by advertisers in the Times-Picayune was the selfsame 'product' sold by the States
.... "Id. at 613 (emphasis added). One wonders if the same result would be reached if, for
example, Time, Inc., the publisher of such magazines as Sports Illustrated and Fortune,
would require advertisements in both magazines as a condition to the right to advertise in
either. Since it is unlikely that the composition of the "readership" of these publications is
similar, it would seem inappropriate to treat the readers as fungibles as to which advertisers
are indifferent. This conclusion is also inconsistent with the Court's later treatment of "block-
booking," United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); see notes 17-19 supra and accom-
panying text, in which it assumed without discussion that copyrighted films were separate
products.
83. Compare 394 U.S. at 498-507 with 345 U.$. at 507-09.
84. The Court's opinion shows the unimportance of a definition of the test-"Whatever
the standards for determining exactly when a transaction involves only a 'single product.'"
Id. at 507.
85. An interesting variation on the one product-two product question is raised in certain
trademark licensing cases. The seller of a trademarked product, who permits the buyer to
use the trademark as an identifying mark in connection with its business, will insist that the
buyer not sell the goods of competing manufacturers under that trademark. In these cases
courts have held that the trademark is not a separate product from the trademarked goods.
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next opportunity, the Court will deal with the issue directly and
forthrightly.
2. Express Agreements
Assuming that there are two separate products, the key ques-
tion facing a court is whether the sale of the tying product actually
was conditioned on the purchase of the tied product. The cases have
used a variety of phrases to express this requirement-that the
purchase of the tied product was "coerced;""5 that there was a
"condition" or "requirement" that both products be taken;" that
the package was "forced" on the buyer or was taken "involun-
tarily;" 's that there was "pressure" or "some modicum of coercion
shown;" 89 or, the legally conclusory form, that the purchases
were "tied."90 Yet, these phrases all express the same concept,
Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1055-57 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912
(1976); Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 77,779, 77,786 (E.D. Mich.
1978). See also Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 460 F.2d 1214, 1215-16 (8th
Cir. 1972) (advertising materials not separate product from franchisee's right to use trade-
mark); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. 78,699, 78,706-07 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (trademark of franchisor not separate from product which is "distinctive under-
lying basis of [franchisor's] business"). In contrast, if the seller-usually a franchisor-
requires the buyer to take unrelated equipment or supplies as a condition of using the
trademarlE, courts have usually found two separate products. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). See generally Levy, Trademark Fran-
chising and Antitrust Law: The Two-Product Rule for Tying Arrangements, 69 TRADEMARK
REP. 41 (1979).
86. See, e.g., Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packag-
ing Corp., 549 F.2d 368,377 n.9 (5th Cir. 1977); Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response,
Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327 (5th Cir. 1976); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d
1211, 1222 & n.9 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (citing additional cases); McAl-
pine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 781
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
87. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); International
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit
Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1173 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979); SmithKline Corp.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1061 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978); Bogosian
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (actual
coercion unnecessary; "leverage or coercion is implicit when plaintiff proves the conditioning
of sales of one product upon purchase of another"); AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc.
v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
88. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504
(1969); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953); United States
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532, 544 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 40 (1962); Moore v. James H.
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977).
90. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 510
(1969) (White, J., dissenting); Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976)
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even if the choice of language does not also convey certain judicial
predispositions to the nature of proof required: there can be no
tying arrangement unless the buyer unwillingly took the second
product in order to be able to take the first product. If the buyer
would freely have chosen to take both anyway, the seller cannot be
deemed to have imposed a tie-in.
Evidence of the tie can either take the form of an express re-
quirement," or there can be an implied agreement, which can be
inferred from the contract itself, from the relationship between the
parties and the facts surrounding their bargaining, or from the na-
ture of the products. Although there is case law to the contrary, 2
the sounder view is that an express requirement in the sales agree-
ment, that the buyer must take both products, will be sufficient to
prove that the acceptance by the buyer of the tied product was not
voluntary.
Because the per se rule applicable to tie-ins separates the exist-
ence and liability issues, the outcome of cases involving even ex-
press ties has been inconsistent. Today even some express tie-ins are
nonetheless not unlawful. 3 This Article will suggest that all express
tie-ins should be unlawful, subject only to the same defenses as
would apply to tie-ins that result from implied agreements. 4
3. Implied Agreements
There is a large amount of case law dealing with situations in
which courts may infer a tying agreement. This issue is important
since if the purchaser had the free choice to buy the tied product
elsewhere, but voluntarily chose to buy it from the seller, any of the
evils that might be present would not be the result of the seller's
conduct or market power. Not only was the buyer not coerced, but
the competing sellers were not foreclosed by the seller's conduct, but
("unremitting policy of tie-in"). Cf. Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d
964, 978 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) (in action by competitor in tied
product market, jury question presented if evidence shows buyers were "'persuaded' to buy
goods which they otherwise would not buy").
91. "Proof that a seller expressly conditioned the sale of one product upon the purchase
of another suffices as proof of the existence of a tie-in without further evidence of coercion."
Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 1978). Accord, Ander-
son Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Dist., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 979, 988 (D. Mass.
1979).
92. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2nd Cir. 1974).
See generally, Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and
Irrelevant, 65 CALF. L. REv. 1149, 1154-58 (1977); Varner, Voluntary Ties and the Sherman
Act, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 271, 284-94 (1977).
93. See text accompanying notes 125-59 infra.
94. See text accompanying notes 164-95 infra.
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if at all only by the fact that the seller offered two separate attrac-
tive products at attractive prices-the very goal of competition. On
the other hand, when the purchase is coerced, not only is this free
choice lost, but competitors of the seller lose sales, not because of
the attractiveness of the tied product but because of the leverage
that flows from the seller's power in a different market. The diffi-
culty arises, of course, because there is no clear line that divides
voluntary purchases from coercion. 5 Rather, there is a continuum,
and the dividing line shifts from case to case.
Absent the express agreement, the existence of the tie-in be-
comes a question of fact-just what was the bargain struck between
the parties. One way of proving an agreement is to infer a tie from
the contract itself." For example, although the contract might give
the buyer an option of finding an alternate supplier for the tied
product within a thirty-day period, the period allowed might, as a
practical matter, be so short that the purchaser has no real alterna-
tive. Similarly the alleged freedom to purchase from approved sup-
pliers of the tied product may be illusory if the seller has refused to
designate such approved suppliers.
Another way of demonstrating a tie-in is to examine the nego-
tiations and relationships between the parties, to show that the
defendant's so-called persuasion was so strong that the buyer felt it
had no practical alternative other than to take the tied product; 8
95. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
96. Compare Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 665-66 (2d Cir.
1974) (plaintiff's proof inadequate to infer coercion from contract terms and parties' negotia-
tions) with Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 87-89 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (defendant's
policy, coupled with contract terms, permits inference of tie-in).
97. These restrictions were the basis of plaintiffs' assertions in Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts
of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211, 1216 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976), that the defendant subjected them to tying arrangements. See
also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450-51 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978) (distinguishing Ungar). Cf. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Pack-
aging Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977) (no tie-in, when alternative sources of supply for
franchises were freely designated).
98. See, e.g., Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 977 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) ("best efforts" clause in contract insufficient evi-
dence; court must also "look at the circumstances surrounding the use of these clauses");
Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (inference justified by "persistent and deliberate misrepresen-
tations, sabotage, and threats of cancellation"); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78
F.R.D. 108, 118 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (plaintiff may show tie "by proving a course of conduct");
Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387, 390 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Cf. F.T.C. v. Texaco,
Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1968) (coercion inherent in relationship between small buyer and
multibillion dollar corporate seller).
An early example of a situation permitting the inference of a tying arrangement is United
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922). The defendant's lease
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otherwise, the seller would refuse to do business with the buyer
altogether. This method of proof involves balancing several compet-
ing interests. Although tying arrangements are thought competi-
tively unhealthy, vigorous bargaining is desirable, since the seller
seeks to increase its sales while the buyer seeks lower prices and
better service and quality.9 The buyer clearly may not prove the
existence of a tying arrangement simply by showing that the defen-
dant's salesmen vigorously sought to make the sale, and even argued
the benefit to both parties of taking additional portions of the
seller's line.' ® The line between hard selling and actual coercion,
however, is not only narrow and vague, but seems to shift among
the reported decisions. Among the factors that courts ought to con-
sider are the relative sizes of the parties; the effect on the buyer of
losing the right to sell the tying product-is it just one of the lines
that the buyer carries, or is the buyer heavily dependent on those
products, as would be true of the typical franchisee; and the eco-
nomic power of the tying product-if the seller refuses to sell that
product to the buyer, are there other similar products to which the
buyer can readily turn, or is that tying product particularly desira-
ble or unique.10' This analysis suggests, for example, that in the
typical franchise case, the franchisor may violate the rule against
tie-ins by many forms of vigorous bargaining. Although that may
place some restraints on its salesmen, this may be necessary to
protect not only the competitors of the franchisor for sales of the tied
product, but to afford flexibility to the franchisee in choosing its
suppliers of those products. '
provisions required, inter alia, that the lessee only use the lessor's machines to perform the
manufacturing functions of that kind of machine, at the risk of losing the leases on all
machines of all types. The Court therefore found that "[wihile the clauses enjoined do not
contain specific agreements not to use the machinery of a competitor of the lessee, the
practical effect of these drastic provisions is to prevent such use." Id. at 457.
99. The Supreme Court has recently affirmed the primacy of vigorous bargaining in
reconciling the goals of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts. United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446-59 (1978). See also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 511 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1328-
30 (5th Cir. 1976); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1224-25 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 528 F.2d 395, 401-02 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131, 1137 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1063 (1972); McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232,
1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
101. Accord, Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977).
The greater the defendant's market power in the tying product, the greater is the likelihood
that it will be able to make its coercion effective. See text accompanying notes 164-95 infra.
102. For an examination of some of the particular problems raised by tying arrange-
ments in a franchising context, see, e.g., Baker, Another Look at Franchise Tie-ins after
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Tie-ins may also be inferred when the seller has so structured
the combination of products as to make it necessary-even inevita-
ble-that both be taken.1 3 This could arise when the technology is
such that only the defendant's products will be compatible with its
separate tying product, or when the seller has refused to release
specifications for the tied product so that no competition can arise
for its sale. '"'
Even if the buyer is free not to take the tied product, it has been
suggested that a tying arrangement may nonetheless be inferred
when the two products are sold together at a significantly lower
price-as part of a "package"-than when offered separately. In
Advance Business Systems and Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,' 5 the
defendant sold its photocopier on a "copy service" basis, according
to which customers paid a single charge based on the number of
copies run on the machine as recorded by a meter; supplies and
service were included in the single charge. The defendant argued
that there was no unlawful tie, since users could have purchased the
machine and the paper and service separately. The court, however,
held that the purchase price of $4250 was not equivalent to the
defendant's rental at a price of three and one-half cents per copy;
therefore it inferred the existence of a tie-in imposed through coer-
cion, because "tie-ins are non-coercive, and therefore legal, only if
the components are separately available to the customer on a bais
[sic] as favorable as the tie-in arrangement."'' 0
Texaco and Fortner, 14 ANTITRUST BuLL. 767 (1969); Harkins, Tying and the Franchisee, 47
ANTTRUST L.J. 903 (1978); Kamenshine, Competition Versus Fairness in Franchising, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 197, 204-09 (1971); McCarthy, Trademark Franchising and Antitrust: The
Trouble with Tie-ins, 58 CAuF. L. REv. 1085 (1970); Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in
Franchisor-Franchisee Relationships, 47 ANTTRUST L.J. 873, 881-85 (1978); Comment,
Franchise Tie-ins and Antitrust: A Critical Analysis, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 847. See also notes
85 supra and 133 infra.
103. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1329-
30 (5th Cir. 1976) (theory accepted, but finding that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient).
104. This, of course, assumes that the two components are indeed separate products,
rather than part of a unitary package. Cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390
F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (automobile manufacturer changed
dashboard design in cars sold without built-in radios, to make later radio installation more
expensive; competing radio manufacturer's request for injunction denied); accord, Dominion
Radio Supply, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 77,522 (E.D. Va. 1979). See
generally Comment, Physical Tie-Ins As Antitrust Violations, 1975 U. ILL. L. F. 224.
In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), plaintiff alleged
that defendant Kodak had introduced new cameras, which were compatible only with
Kodak's new film cartridge, making plaintiff's old film obsolete. The court denied plaintiff's
request that, in the future, Kodak be required to reveal in advance specifications of new
products so the plaintiff would be able to offer compatible competing film.
105. 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
106. Id. at 62. See also United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 54-55 (1962) (approv-
ing decree prohibiting differentials in price between each film when sold separately, and when
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The increased use of the class action device in antitrust litiga-
tion has contributed to the confusion regarding the type of proof
necessary to show that the buyer was coerced to accept the tying
arrangement. Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
under which most such class actions are brought, requires that the
court make a finding "that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members."'' 07 In the tying arrangement context, this
has given rise to the so-called "individual coercion" doctrine-the
plaintiff must prove that it was "required" to take the tied product.
Absent an express agreement, the plaintiff then must rely on certain
facts which justify the inference that the requirement existed. In
opposing the certification of a class, the defendant naturally will
argue that the facts that would permit this inference will differ
because of its individual relationships with each purchaser, and that
therefore certification is improper. The result of this dispute has
been a number of cases"0 8 devoted not to the broader question of
sold as a package, except when price differentials are cost justified). American Mfg. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 283 (2d Cir. 1967);
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 697 (D. S.C. 1977), aff'd 594 F.2d
979 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3431 (1980).
This theory was extended in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.Supp. 983 (D. Conn.
1978). Plaintiff, a manufacturer of low speed paper copiers, complained that defendant-who
manufactured both low and high speed paper copiers-had violated the Sherman and Clayton
Acts by offering its Machine Utilization Plan (MUP), which allowed users to combine total
uses of all their machines, to obtain higher discounts. The plaintiff asserted that MUP was
an incentive for those who would only have used the defendant's high speed machine, and
competitors' low speed machines, to use all of defendant's machines. The trial court offered
a jury instruction, accepting the plaintiff's theory that this was a tying arrangement, even
though it was conceded that no customer had to take a low speed machine as a condition of
getting a high speed machine; any coercion was purely economic. The instruction read that
"a tying arrangement results if the economic realities of the situation effectively coerce the
customer into taking one product in order to get another product that he wants." 463 F. Supp.
at 1017.
The Advance Business Systems approach was limited in Fontana Aviation, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 460 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 & n.11 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
108. Cases in which the court refused to certify the suit as a class action because of
failure to satisfy the individual coercion doctrine include Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Amer-
ica, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Cash v. Arctic Circle,
Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,438, aff'd after reconsideration, 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,440 (E.D.
Wash. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 79 F.R.D. 603 (D. N.J. 1978);
Schuler v. Better Equip. Launder Center, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 85 (D. Mass. 1977); Halverson v.
Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Smith v. Denny's Rest., Inc., 62
F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
See also Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969); Lah v. Shell Oil Co.,
50 F.R.D. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
Cases in which the individual coercion doctrine was raised and which were certified as
class actions include Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
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what evidence would justify the inference of coercion, but rather to
the narrow question of what evidence is permitted in a class action,
to generalize about the existence of that coercion. Because of diffi-
culties of proving, in the class action context, that each individual
plaintiff was coerced, a number of cases have held that the matter
may not be certified, and the action has been dismissed."9 A note
of caution against reading those cases too broadly must be sounded.
They ought not extend to a statement about the underlying exist-
ence of the tying arrangements or whether they could have been
proved had each seller brought its own lawsuit."10
4. Full Line Forcing
A variation on the traditional tying arrangement which is some-
what difficult to reconcile with the absolute per se rule argued for
in this Article is "full-line forcing." This technique involves the
appointment by a manufacturer of a dealer to carry its line of prod-
ucts; as a condition of the right to purchase a portion of that line,
the dealer is required to purchase and offer for resale the manufac-
turer's complete line of products. Assume that a manufacturer of
power tools appoints a hardware store as its dealer. The manufac-
turer may insist that the store carry not only its drills but also its
sanders and saws. It would be difficult to argue that the separate
kinds of tools are not two (or more) distinct products. Yet, in most
circumstances, the cases suggest that these arrangements should be
lawful."'
First, the manufacturer has a legitimate interest in having the
434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Fifth Moorings Condominium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712 (S.D. Fla.
1979); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Hill v. A-T-O, Inc.,
80 F.R.D. 68 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), on remand from 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976); Krehl v. Baskin-
Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978); and Hi-Co Enterprises, Inc. v.
Conagra, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 628 (S.D. Ga. 1976). See also AAMCO Automatic Transmissions,
Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 55 F.R.D.
259, 263 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
109. See cases cited in note 108 supra.
110. See Austin, supra note 92; Varner, supra note 92; Note, Tying Arrangements and
the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VMID. L. REv. 755 (1977); 9 CONN. L. REV. 164 (1976);
55 T x. L. REV. 343 (1977). Cf. Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217
(9th Cir. 1977) (individual coercion need not be shown in nonclass action context); Ungar v.
Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1219 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976) ("coercion" is element of substantive law on tie-ins; "individual coercion" arises only
in class action context).
111. But siee Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 452 (9th Cir. 1979)
(summary judgment on § 3 of the Clayton Act inappropriate); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co.
v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708-13 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (full-




dealer offer its complete line. If the manufacturer engages in adver-
tising that names the stores that are its authorized dealers, it would
complicate marketing if some dealers offered only a portion of the
line for sale. More important, these restraints are unlikely to have
the anticompetitive effects ascribed to most tying arrangements.
The typical foreclosure of competitors is nonexistent."2 There is
nothing about the tie itself that prevents the dealer from also carry-
ing the goods of another competing manufacturer.113 Furthermore,
the other concern of tie-ins-the requirement that the buyer pur-
chase goods that it does not want-is de minimis. The full-line
forcing clauses do not by themselves require the dealer to purchase
any fixed quantity of each product in the line. Thus, the require-
ment of the clauses would be satisfied if the dealer bought-and
offered for resale-only one sander and one saw, purchasing more
of these items from the manufacturer only if it resold these products
and had to restock its line.'
5. Different Sellers of the Tying and Tied Products
Under the classic definition of a tying arrangement,"' the same
company will be offering both the tying and tied products. Three
situations in which there are two different sellers deserve discussion.
In one variation the sellers of the tying and tied products are differ-
ent but related-either parent-subsidiary or subsidiaries of the
same company. For example, in Fortner, the plaintiff, after obtain-
ing a loan from the U.S. Steel Credit Corporation, was required to
use the money to buy prefabricated homes from the Company's
Homes Division. Not only did the Court have no difficulty dealing
with this in the same way as the more traditional tie-in," , but this
fact became an additional reason for finding that there were two
112. See generally Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 641
(10th Cir. 1972); L. SuLuvAN, supra note 68, at § 158.
113. If there were such requirements, they would be dealt with under the separate
although related proscription of certain exclusive dealing arrangements. See Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1949).
114. Other concerns might be raised if the seller were to impose onerous requirements,
including sales quotas, for the right to remain an authorized dealer.
115. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
116. It is interesting to contrast this approach-treating the two companies as the same
seller-with the so-called "bathtub conspiracy" cases, in which even two subsidiaries may
be deemed separate persons for the purpose of finding a conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman
Act. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951).
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separate products that were capable of being the subject of a tie."7
A second possible variation typically occurs in franchise cases, in
which the franchisee is required to purchase food, supplies or equip-
ment from one or more designated and approved suppliers. Once
again, the cases have not treated these differently from the tradi-
tional tie-ins. These third party supplier situations have become
very common in franchising situations. In fact, in one recent case,18
the court absolved the defendant-a franchisor-because it was sell-
ing both the tying and tied products, thereby distinguishing other
franchise tie-in cases imposing liability."' The third variation-not
dramatically different from the second-is found in the so-called
"TBA cases."'' 0 In the 1960s, a number of oil companies adopted
programs of "sponsoring" the tires, batteries and accessories of
other independent companies. In consideration for inducing its
dealers to carry these products, the oil companies were paid a com-
mission (kickback) by the sponsoring company. The courts have
generally found these arrangments unlawful.
Clearly, none of these variations would fall within section 3 of
the Clayton Act, for that statute only makes it unlawful "for any
person. . . to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods...
or other commodities . . . on the condition . . . that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . .. of a
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller" (emphasis added).
For example, the tire companies were not competitors of the oil
companies; rather, the oil companies were allegedly using their sales
leverage to channel sales away from certain tire companies, toward
the other companies with which they had agreements. In the TBA
cases most of the challenges were brought under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act; 121 the Commission alleged that
117. 394 U.S. at 507 & n.4. See also United States Steel Corp. v Fortner Enterprises,
Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 613 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1958).
118. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 628 (4th Cir. 1979).
119. See, e.g., Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 n.4 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
Esposito v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,414, 77,423-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). See also
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 930 (1979) (licensee was required to purchase parts from manufacturers designated by
licensor). Cf. Keener v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1979) (seller
must have some financial interest in sales of tied product); accord Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins
Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 120 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
120. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967).
121. One such action, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968), was followed by an
unsuccessful treble damage action, brought under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Belliston v.
Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972). Accord, Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
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these arrangements were "unfair methods of competition." Since
that statute reaches "antitrust violations in their incipiency,"12 2 this
conduct might be unlawful even if it were not condemned under
traditional tying arrangement analysis.
In addition to reliance on the FTC Act, there are two ap-
proaches that are available under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which broadly condemns all "combinations . . .in restraint of
trade." One possibility is that implicitly relied on in Fortner. When
there is a close relationship between the two sellers-either because
of common ownership or payment of commissions-the courts may
overlook the separate corporate identities and treat them as one for
tying arrangement purposes. ' " Another possibility is to treat the
conduct as a conspiracy to restrain trade by the use of the tying
arrangement device. Under this theory the seller of the tying prod-
uct and the seller of the tied product would be viewed as conspira-
tors, seeking to advance an anticompetitive end by the joint use of
their market power. 12 Although it would not be necessary under a
conspiracy theory, courts that have adopted this approach have
insisted that the seller of the tying product have some financial
interest in the sales of the tied product.
2
1
B. Liability: Is the Conduct Unlawful?
Once there is a finding that the conduct constitutes a tying
arrangement, the next step is to determine whether it violates the
antitrust laws. It has not been made sufficiently clear why this
inquiry should be necessary at all. In part the inquiry arises from
the assumption that unless the seller has some significant market
power in the tying product market, it will be unable to enforce the
tie and hence unable either to coerce the buyer or to foreclose its
competitors in the tied product market. This Article suggests that
coercion is inherent in any true tie-in; that the inquiry regarding the
308 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 940 (1970). But see Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), further opinion on damage issue, 324 F.2d 566 (4th
Cir. 1963), which held that a requirement that a Sinclair gasoline dealer purchase Goodyear
TBA constituted an unlawful tying arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
122. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312
U.S. 457, 466 (1941).
123. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 834-35 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Johnson v. Nationwide Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp.
948, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1978). See generally Austin, supra note 45, at 95.
124. Imperial Point Colonnades Condominium, Inc. v. Mangurian, 549 F.2d 1029, 1043
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).




defendant's market power should therefore become part of the de-
termination of the existence of the tie, rather than a part of the
liability issue; and that any overestimate of this market power will
be relatively unimportant, since condemning even noninjurious ties
will have little if any adverse societal effects.
The development of the test for determining liability has been
uneven. In Times-Picayune, the Court indicated that there were
four different ways of showing the illegality of a tie. First, if the
conduct fell within section 3 of the Clayton Act, a tie would be
unlawful per se if "the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the
market for the 'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of com-
merce in the 'tied' product is restrained.'""I The Clayton Act, how-
ever, is reserved for tying arrangements involving the sale or lease
of goods or commodities. If the tie-in involves a license-for exam-
ple, the right to use a trademark-or if either the tying or the tied
product is not a good or commodity-for example, money, land, a
service or a trademark-the arrangement would have to be attacked
under the Sherman Act.l12
The second alternative offered in Times-Picayune was that if
the conduct did not satisfy the Clayton Act, the standard of per se
illegality under section 1 of the Sherman Act would be satisfied
"whenever both conditions are met."'' 8 Then, "[in either case, the
arrangement transgresses § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
since minimally that section registers violations of the Clayton and
Sherman Acts."128 Finally, if none of these tests was satisfied, the
Court stated that the conduct, while not per se unreasonable, still
might be unlawful "under the Sherman Act's general prohibition on
unreasonable restraints of trade."'30
Since Times-Picayune, the test has gone through some refor-
mulations. The most significant restatement of the per se approach
is in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States:
[Tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a
party has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appre-
ciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a "not
insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce [in the tied product market]
is affected. 3'
126. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) (emphasis in
original).
127. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661 n.1 (2d Cir.
1974).
128. 345 U.S. at 609 (emphasis in original).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 614.
131. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The Court in Northern
Pacific suggested that "monopolistic position," as used in Times-Picayune, meant no more
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It is to the treatment of this test over the past two decades that this
Article now turns.
1. Tying Product Market
The element of the per se test that has caused the greatest
confusion is the requirement that the defendant have "sufficient
economic power" in the tying product market. This factor is used
to demonstrate that the seller really has the ability to coerce the
buyer to take both products. Absent that market power, it simply
would have no "leverage" to force the buyer to take the tied product.
This power may be demonstrated in a number of ways. Loew's and
Fortner I suggest that the question is whether the tying product is
"unique" or "particularly desirable." 3 ' One way to demonstrate
this is simple reliance on the fact that the tying product is patented,
copyrighted, or-like real property-otherwise not capable of dupli-
cation by the seller's competitors.1ss Northern Pacific also states
than "sufficient economic power." Id. at 11. The standard in Times-Picayune-that the
defendant have a "monopolistic position" in the tying product market-can be harmonized
with the standard in Northern Pacific-that the defendant have "sufficient economic power"
with respect to the tying product-by a broad definition of monopoly. Instead of defining
monopoly in the Sherman § 2 sense-which may require at least a 60% share of the relevant
market, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d Cir.
1945)-Justice Clark in Times-Picayune may have meant monopoly power as that term is
used by the economist-"a seller with a meaningfully downward-sloping demand curve for
his product," see Burstein, supra note 31, at 74, and therefore whose pricing decisions affect
the amount of goods taken. A seller with monopoly power in that sense certainly has
"sufficient economic power in the tying product, to effect a restraint of trade in the market
for the tied product." 356 U.S. at 19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
132. "[T]he crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desira-
bility to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes." United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 45 (1962), quoted in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 503 (1969).
133. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,505 n.2 (1969);
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 & n.4 (1962). This presumptive approach is
criticized in Austin, supra note 45, at 111-12; Note, The Presumption of Market Power in
Sales of Legally Differentiated Tying Products, 56 Tax. L. Pav. 1305 (1978).
There is some disagreement whether trademarks will also confer this automatic unique-
ness. A few cases suggest that a trademark cannot even be a separate tying product. See, e.g.,
Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1215 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 823 (1976) (answer is not "an obvious one"); note 85 supra. Although the majority
of cases accept the proposition that trademarks may be a part of a tying arrangement, they
are divided on the question whether the mere existence of the trademark-which by definition
is unique in the sense that no one else may use it for that product without the owner's
permission-is almost automatic proof of "sufficient economic power in the tying product."
Compare Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 722 (7th Cir. 1979); Warriner
Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1012-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1086 (1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Martino v. McDonald's Sys. Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 90 (N.D. Ill.
1979); McAlpine v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-41 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 119-20 (C.D. Cal. 1978);
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that "[t]he very existence of [a] host of tying arrangements is
itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great [market] power,
at least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the
existence of these restraints";' 4 the fact that a number of buyers
succumbed to the seller's pressure suggests that it had some ability
to exert its leverage. Yet, this approach was left in serious doubt by
Fortner II, which held that a plaintiff must prove not only that the
seller offered a unique tying product, but must also prove that,
either because of legal barriers, for example, a patent, or because
of financial disadvantages, competitors of the seller were unable to
offer the same product at the same price.
135
There has been a great deal of analysis, both in the cases and
in the literature, devoted to different factual patterns and different
approaches for demonstrating this market power. This Article
argues that Fortner II and the trend it fostered'36 represent an un-
Joe Westbrook, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 419 F. Supp. 824, 835 (N.D. Ga. 1976); AAMCO
Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 436-37 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Detroit
City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 458-71 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 748, 752-53 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (unique trademark
creates strong presumption of market power) with Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d
39, 47-49 (5th Cir. 1976); Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663-65 (2d
Cir. 1974); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Cash v. Arctic Circle, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,438,
aff'd after reconsideration, 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,440, 77,442-43 (E.D. Wash. 1979); Esposito
v. Mister Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,414, 77,420 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)(trademark merely
evidentiary of market power in tying product market). The Susser case is discussed in Han-
dler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 852-59 (1965); 66 COLUM.
L. REv. 405 (1966); 63 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1965). The Siegel case is discussed in Note, Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., What's In a Name?, 5 GEO. L. REV. 151 (1970); 84 HAIv. L. Rav.
1717 (1971); 23 HAST. L.J. 1147 (1972). See generally, McCarthy, supra note 102; Smirti,
Trademarks As Tying Products: The Presumption of Economic Power, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 1
(1979); Comment, Tying and Exclusive Dealing Agreements: Protection for Franchise Trade-
mark Licensors, 45 TULANE L. REV. 1016 (1971).
134. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958).
135. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). On
remand from Fortner I, the Circuit Court upheld a judgment for the plaintiff, relying in part
on the fact "that an appreciable number of customers accepted the tied product." 523 F.2d
961, 966 (6th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court rejected this approach, 429 U.S. at 618 & n.10,
stating that "the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his competi-
tors in the market for the tying product. Without any such advantage differentiating his
product from that of his competitors, the seller's product does not have the kind of uniqueness
considered relevant in prior tying-clause cases." Id. at 620-21. See also Phillips v. Crown
Cent. Petroleum Corp., 602 F.2d 616, 628-29 (4th Cir. 1979).
136. Fortner II was followed in Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th
Cir. 1978). Defendant provided the service of selling breeder chickens and then buying their
eggs only on the condition that plaintiff purchase chicken feed from it. The Fifth Circuit
reversed a judgment for plaintiff, which had been based on a finding that plaintiff bought
the feed from defendant only because it was the only company providing these services-i.e.,
the tying product was unique-because there was no showing that other feed companies could
not have offered this service had they so desired. Although there may have been no adverse
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healthy and inappropriate deviation from prior treatment of tying
arrangements. Until Fortner II, in each case in which the Court
found a tying arrangement present, it also concluded that the con-
duct violated the antitrust laws." 7 In Fortner II, however, the Court
found that notwithstanding the existence of the tie-in, there was no
injury to competition and therefore no violation. Although the Court
had previously stated on several occasions that tying arrangements
rarely have any procompetitive value,'38 here it allowed U.S. Steel's
practice to stand undisturbed. Fortner II is part of the Court's new
"economic realism,"'' under which conduct will not be condemned
unless adverse economic effects are clear. Since one of the evils
described in earlier cases-foreclosure of competitors-was not pres-
ent here, the Court found the arrangement lawful. It reached this
conclusion by finding that U.S. Steel did not have sufficient eco-
nomic power in the credit (tying product) market.
This evaluation of the seller's market power is relevant to deter-
mine whether it has the ability to impose the tie. It is unclear,
however, why it is critical that the seller's competitors might have
offered the tying product but chose not to. There should be two key
inquiries in tying analysis: Were competitors (and competition)
injured? Was the buyer coerced? Even if competitors were not fore-
closed, the Court in Fortner II ignored another significant evil of tie-
ins-that the buyer was forced to take products that it did not want,
at least not from that seller. 4 ' Clearly, U.S. Steel had enough power
in the credit market to force Fortner to take its prefabricated homes.
Given an admittedly express tie, and given that the buyer was
forced to take goods it did not want, it should be unnecessary to
evaluate the impact of this conduct on U.S. Steel's competitors.
The Court's fundamental but unstated problem in Fortner II
was its apparent uneasiness with the earlier holding that there really
effect on the seller's competitors, the injury to plaintiff was far clearer. Yet the court seemed
oblivious to the fact that the only choice for the plaintiff-buyer was to pay a supernormal
price for the tied product or go out of business.
137. Times-Picayune is not inconsistent with this assertion, since in that case the Court
found that morning and evening newspaper advertising were "one product." Therefore in that
case there was no tying arrangement. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
139. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
140. The Court made clear its diminished concern for buyer freedom in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). Responding to the view that
"the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent
businessmen even though they have no impact on 'price, quality, and quantity of goods and
services,'" the Court said, "Competitive economies have social and political as well as eco-
nomic advantages, . . . but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would
lack any objective benchmarks." (citations omitted).
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were two separate products and therefore there indeed was a tying
arrangement. Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion makes this
clear, suggesting that the finding of the existence of the tie-in really
was compelled by the law of the case doctrine rather than any inde-
pendent analysis in Fortner I. 4 Yet, if one accepts the premise that
there really was a tie-in, then the Court's adroit gymnastics in ex-
panding the proof required to show "sufficient market power" offer
an inadequate explanation for permitting U.S. Steel to have en-
gaged in this particular conduct.
In Fortner I the dissent viewed the arrangement-giving cheap
credit to promote homes-as nothing more than taking a lower price
on the homes themselves.' If this was what really happened, then
the dissenting Justices were right that there indeed was no tying
arrangement. One hardly thinks that his local Chevrolet dealer is
tying credit to the sale of the car when it offers the buyer GMAC
financing on the car, even if the financing is cheaper than his bank
would offer and even if it is absolutely clear that he could not use
this financing to buy a Ford."' U.S. Steel, however, did more than
this. It made a loan of two million dollars to finance the purchase
of about $700,000 worth of homes. This, then, would be like the
Chevrolet dealer lending the customer $20,000, so that he could get
driving lessons and add a garage to his house, but only if he bought
the car from the lending dealer. If it is true that the customer-and
numerous other persons in his situation-simply cannot get the
money to buy driving lessons other than by using the Chevrolet
loan, then the Chevrolet dealer has a substantial advantage relative
to Ford, and indeed can foreclose Ford from selling some cars. Fur-
thermore, even if Ford could have offered similar terms but simply
failed to do so, a large number of buyers will involuntarily have their
choice of cars narrowed to Chevrolets. In this situation competition
can be adversely affected,' and there is no reason for tolerating the
arrangement on the theory that Chevrolet could have structured it
in another fashion. Similarly, U.S. Steel's market power in the
credit market allowed it to transfer its power to another market
141. 429 U.S. 610, 622-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id., at 612 n.1
(majority opinion).
142. 394 U.S. 495, 510-20 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 520-25 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
143. On the other hand, there would be a tying arrangement if the auto manufacturer
sold cars to dealers only if they agreed to offer only the manufacturer's financing to their retail
customers. United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941). See also
Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 853 (1946).
144. Accord, Hi-Co Enterprises, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 628 (S.D. Ga. 1976)
(manufacturer of chicken feed lent money to farmers, which was used to purchase chickens,
on condition that borrowers purchase its feed).
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where it was unable to compete as well on the merits of price and
quality.4 '
The next Section of this Article,'" therefore, suggests that the
present examination of the defendant's market power be modified.
Rather than being a separate element, relevant to the determination
of liability, market power should be relevant to whether the defen-
dant could have, and did, impose a tying arrangement. Proceeding
on the premise that tie-ins rarely yield competitive benefits, we can
then conclude that if the tie-in was coercively imposed, this should
be sufficient for liability.
2. Tied Product Market
Happily, there is one element of tying analysis which is simple
and straightforward. Proof of the restraint of a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce in the tied product" market is made pursuant
to the "quantitative substantiality" test."' The plaintiff need sim-
ply show that the dollar amount of tied goods purchased was more
than de minimis.'"I In International Salt, this figure was only
$500,000,"'1 and although the Loew's case is not as clear, it suggests
that somewhat less than $60,000 may be enough.'" Furthermore, in
a treble damage action, since the theory is that the plaintiff is a
145. Cf. Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1978). The
plaintiff alleged that as a condition of obtaining credit from the defendant bank, it was
required to use the bank's services of buying commercial paper at a discount. The court held
that the defendant's credit gave it enough leverage in the tying product market to sustain
the jury verdict for plaintiff, since the plaintiff had been unsuccessful in obtaining credit
elsewhere, and there was evidence that the defendant was able to impose unusual and bur-
densome conditions on the plaintiff. See also United States v. Investors Diversified Services,
Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951) (credit tied to insurance policy).
146. See text accompanying notes 164-95 infra.
147. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299, 314 (1949). As
noted above, when the conduct falls under § 3 of the Clayton Act the per se standard is
satisfied if either prong of the test is met. See notes 126-31 supra and accompanying text.
Therefore, the inquiry regarding the amount of commerce affected may be unnecessary in
Clayton Act actions.
148. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
149. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947).
150. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) (as to one defendant, its total
license fee was $60,800, of which an unspecified "substantial portion. . . represented the cost
of the inferior [tied] films which the stations were required to accept"). Curiously, there was
no reference to this amount in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 501-02 (1969), in which defendant had asserted that plaintiff's annual purchases of the
tied product of $190,000 were "insubstantial." Although conceding that this was less than the
$500,000 in International Salt, the Court merely stated that this amount was nonetheless not
"paltry." See also AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 436
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum that $50,000 may be enough).
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"private attorney general," the relevant amount is not the pur-
chases of that plaintiff only but of all purchasers subject to the tie.,
5
C. Defenses
Tying arrangements rarely yield competitive benefits. Never-
theless, in those situations in which the advantages will outweigh
any injury to competition, the courts have recognized specific excep-
tions to the so-called per se rule. 52 There are four such defenses: (1)
preservation of the goodwill of the seller; (2) certain business justifi-
cations; (3) special needs of new entrants; and (4) economies real-
ized by combination sales.
1. Goodwill Defense
The goodwill defense was first suggested in 1935 in Pick Manu-
facturing. Co. v. General Motors Corp.5 ' Defendant, the seller of
Chevrolet cars, insisted that its authorized dealers use only Chevro-
let replacement parts in their repair operations, of which it was the
sole supplier. The court approved this requirement, on the theory
that dealers' use of potentially inferior non-Chevrolet parts could
lead to customer dissatisfaction with the automobile itself. The tie
was justified so that General Motors could preserve goodwill to-
wards its products. The goodwill defense often reappears in more
modern form in the licensing of franchises.'54 Both the franchisor
and the franchisees are concerned that all other franchisees offer
goods or services of uniform quality; dissatisfaction by a customer
with one franchisee may dissuade her from patronizing all other
151. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969);
Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62-63 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
152. This seeming contradiction-of an apparent per se rule with potential excep-
tions-has caused some confusion in the lower courts. For example, in Miller v. Granados,
529 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1976), the court refused to consider the goodwill defense, see text
accompanying notes 153-56 infra, because "once a tying arrangement is found to exist in
context of sufficient economic power, its illegality is established without further inquiry into
business excuses for its uses."
153. 80 F.2d 641, 643-44 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936). See also
FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), which, while not speaking directly of this
defense, was considered in Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 607
(1953) to be an example of "a means of protecting the goodwill of the lessor's branded gas."
154. See, e.g., Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-47 (5th
Cir. 1976); Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1016 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Esposito v. Mister
Softee, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. 77,414, 77,422-3 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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franchisees. Therefore, the franchisor may insist on selling all sup-
plies and equipment to its franchisees, to guarantee uniformly high
quality.!55
In application, the goodwill defense has been limited by the
requirement that it be the least restrictive alternative available to
the seller.'56 If specification of the particulars of the tied product
could assure the same high level of quality, the defense will not be
available. Thus, as a practical matter, the defense should be avail-
able only for a specialized and nonfungible tied product, when the
specifications would be highly detailed and not subject to quality
control, or when the tied product is the subject of a patent or trade
secret, so that the seller has a legitimate reason for preventing third
parties from its manufacture.
2. Business Justification
The business justification defense is closely related to the good-
will defense. The two products may be so related that use of a
product meeting the specifications of the tied product will be neces-
sary for the proper functioning of the tying product. For example,
in International Salt the defendant claimed that the use of inferior
salt in connection with its patented injection machine-the tying
product-would cause it to malfunction, which problem the user
would then blame on the machine. The Court, in rejecting the de-
fense on the ground that specification of the quality of the salt to
be used would have equally assured the proper functioning of the
machine, remarked that "it is not pleaded, nor is it argued, that the
machine is allergic to salt of equal quality produced by anyone
except International. '' 57
155. In fact, if as usually occurs, the franchisor is licensing a trademark, §§ 5 and 45 of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (1976), will impose a requirement of quality control,
at the risk of constituting misuse of the trademark. This fact is often used by the seller as an
additional justification for tie-ins. See generally McCarthy, supra note 102, at 1091 n.36,
1111-16; Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in Franchising Arrangements,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 435 (1968); Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 926 (1965).
156. See, e.g., Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217-18 (9th Cir.
1977), and cases cited in note 154 supra.
157. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947). A similar conten-
tion had been made by defendant in International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298
U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936), see text accompanying note 12 supra. Defendant's argument that its
machines would be impaired by the use of any cards other than its own was seriously undercut
by the fact that it allowed one particular lessee-the government-to use other cards upon a
payment of a larger rental fee on the tying product. This made clear that the defendant's
principal objective was not to protect its goodwill, but rather to obtain an enhanced com-
bined price for the machine and the cards.
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On the other hand, United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp. 158
upheld a requirement by a seller of community television antennas
that certain equipment-cables, electronic units, and so forth-had
to be purchased from it. Because of the sophisticated nature of these
related products and the lack of control over their quality, there was
a strong likelihood that inferior products would cause the entire
system to malfunction. Once competitive equipment of equal qual-
ity became available, however, these restraints were no longer per-
missible. Thus, once again, the availability of the defense will be
tested by whether it is the least restrictive alternative available to
the seller.'59
3. New Entrant
There is some suggestion that a company seeking to enter a new
market will be entitled to use a tying arrangement to enable it to
stake out a market share."'0 Thus, the holding in Jerrold that the
fact that the cable television industry was new and that quality
defects could result in its collapse might offer an additional justifi-
cation for use of the tie. On the other hand, Jerrold also held that
the defense, even if available at one time to the new entrant, did
not continue to be available after the company was in operation for
a period of time.6 ' This approach quite properly attempts to bal-
158. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
159. "The only situation, indeed, in which protection of good will may necessitate the
use of tying clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed'that they
could not practicably be supplied." Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
306 (1949).
The business justification defense was successful in Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458,
466-69 (1st Cir. 1962); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
77,991 (D. Ore. 1979); Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. 77,779, 77,788-
89 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (alternative holding); Teleflex Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
293 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See also Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267
F.2d 11, 14 (6th Cir. 1959) (issue must be determined at trial). See generally Note,
Antitrust-Tying Arrangements: Tying of Goods and Service Justified by a Sound Business
Reason, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 746 (1961); Comment, Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws: The "Integrity of the Product"Defense, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1413 (1964); Note, Dehydrat-
ing Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp.-A Lesson in Identification, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 107 (1962);
Note, Business Justifications for Tying Agreements: A Retreat from the Per Se Doctrine, 17
WEST. RES. L. REV. 257 (1965).
160. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962) (dictum), quoted in
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
161. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 18 F. Supp. 650 (D. Del. 1937). Accord, Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d
43, 50-51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). See generally Note, Newcomer
Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STA. L.
REv. 457 (1960); Note, The Use of Tie-ins in New Industries, 70 YALE L.J. 804 (1961).
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ance the need for the tie-in with its presumed anticompetitive ef-
fect-a traditional rule of reason analysis.
4. Economies of Combination Sales
The economies defense proceeds on the premise that it may be
cheaper to produce and sell the two separate products as a package
unit than to sell them separately.6 2 The forced purchase of the two
products is necessary to realize this cost savings. While this defense
is appealing and may apply to certain factual situations, it should
not be necessary in most cases. If it truly is cheaper to sell the two
products in a package rather than as separate components, the
seller can adjust its price to take this into account. Presumably, the
buyer will appreciate this lower package price and would buy both
products without the necessity of the seller's forcing them on it by
a tie-in.
Two situations may be exceptions to this proposition. First, it
may be necessary for all buyers to take the package to realize the
economies; if only some choose the package, there would be cost
savings to none. An example is suggested by the facts of Times-
Picayune. "13 Assume that it was cheaper to set only one page of type
for all classified advertisements rather than one advertisement page
for the morning newspaper and a different one for the evening
paper; deleting only a few advertisements from each page would
have eliminated most of the cost savings. At least if the savings are
significant, it might be appropriate to require all advertisers to sub-
mit to the tie-in. A second exception might be when there is a cost
savings, but the seller desires to retain it entirely, rather than pass
any portion along to the buyer, so that the "package price" would
not be cheaper. Here, there is an "economic" benefit, but absent the
tie it would not be realized. There might be some policy justification
for holding such attempted ties unlawful, simply to require the
seller to pass along at least some portion of the cost savings to the
buyer. However, economists would probably argue that it is prefera-
ble to have the seller realize these economies than have no one
receive them.
162. Alternatively, the cost savings resulting from the aggregation may be a basis for
concluding that the components are only "one product," so that there is no tie-in at all. See,
e.g., ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 232
(N.D. Cal. 1978). Compare id. with text accompanying notes 77-84 supra.
163. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 623 (1953).
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IV. THE NEW APPROACH
A. Combining the Existence and Liability Issues
The conclusions reached by this Article should now be obvious.
Tying arrangements often injure competition; they will only rarely
produce procompetitive results. Thus, there is no harm in condemn-
ing them outright. The present approach reflects both confusion and
timidity. Having concluded that tying arrangements "serve hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,"'' 4 it is curious
that the Court continues with the present bifurcated analysis-first
existence, then liability. The factors presently used to determine
liability should instead be used to determine whether a doubtful
situation really is a tie-in, within the meaning of the per se rule.
Having determined that there is a tie-in, there is no reason to shy
away from the conclusion that there is a violation of the antitrust
laws. The test proposed by this Article would proceed in two steps.
The court would first determine whether there is a tying arrange-
ment that affects at least a not insubstantial amount of commerce
in the tied product market."5 Then, if the answer is affirmative, the
court would proceed immediately to "look at any proffered defen-
ses.166
The first step will obviously be both more complicated and
more critical than at present. Since a premise of this Article, how-
ever, is that tying arrangements deserve harsh treatment, if the
plaintiff can show that there is an express tie-in contract between
the parties, this contract should always be unlawful, subject only to
the defenses. In this case, there should be no need to ask if the
defendant had some power in the tying product, if it used it, or,
again subject to the defenses, even why the tie-in was imposed. The
only inquiries would be whether there were two separate products,
and if so, whether the contract expressly required the buyer to take
both.
In the more usual case the existence of an agreement will have
164. See note 7 supra.
165. This requirement should be retained to insure that the courts do not have to deal
with tie-ins in which the effect on competition, while arguably negative, is really de minimis.
166. Although this approach might appear to make it always easier for the plaintiff to
prevail, in fact it may occasionally have the opposite effect. Today, at least in theory, when
conduct falls within the Clayton Act, the test of liability could be satisfied without any
examination of market power, see text accompanying note 126 supra, if the sales of the tied
product were "not insubstantial"; as noted earlier, see text accompanying notes 147-51 supra,
this is hardly a very strict standard. But see note 202 infra (suggesting that this less restrictive
Clayton Act § 3 test may no longer be good law). In any event, this Article suggests that
market power in the tying product should be relevant in all cases, although for different
purposes than at present.
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to be inferred from the contract or from the bargaining and relation-
ship between the parties. Here, as an aid to the application of the
criteria used under existing case law, it will be useful to inquire
whether the defendant had the power to make the tie-in effective,
and whether the defendant actually used that power.
1. Express Tie-ins
The easier case under this proposed approach would be the
express tie-where the nature of the contract made it unequivocally
clear that the buyer was required to take the tied product to receive
the tying product. This conduct should be tolerated in only a few
rare situations.'67 If there is an express tie, the courts should proceed
immediately to an examination of any of certain recognized defenses
that might be offered.
There are at least two situations that would appear to create
difficulties if this approach were adopted. One is the fact pattern
in Fortner. There was no doubt that U.S. Steel would not have
offered credit to Fortner unless he also agreed to purchase its prefa-
bricated homes; the loan of money was clearly restricted to U.S.
Steel's tied product. This would certainly appear to be an express
tie. Yet the Court held the practice lawful, on the grounds that the
seller's competitors could also have offered the same credit terms.
Since they had voluntarily forsaken this opportunity, they were not
foreclosed and hence competition was not injured. It is apparent
that many of the difficulties in that case result from the fact that
the tying product was credit with which to buy the tied product. As
suggested above, 6" the route adopted to find legality in Fortner
If-based on the defendant's absence of market power-may have
been the only escape from the strictures imposed by the law of the
case doctrine.
An alternative, which would have been consistent with the ap-
proach argued for in this Article, would have been to conclude that
despite the apparent "express" nature of U.S. Steel's requirement,
this case still involved only an implied tie, or no tie at all. An
underlying theme in tie-in cases is the unwillingness to penalize a
seller merely for offering more attractive terms to a buyer. The seller
may be a new entrant or a company facing vigorous competition. In
order to make more sales, the seller may be willing to accept lower
profits or to accept greater risks. This sales strategy may be re-
167. "[Tlying arrangements generally served no legitimate business purpose that can-
not be achieved in some less restrictive way. . . ... Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
168. See notes 135-45 supra and accompanying text.
19801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
flected in offering a second, related product at a bargain price-so-
called promotional pricing. Thus, the fact that a large number of
buyers take the "package," standing by itself, may be evidence of
an absence of market power, and may prove nothing more than that
the buyers were astute enough to recognize a good deal when of-
fered."6 9 By itself, it says nothing about the seller's ability to coerce
them to take the entire package. Therefore, in Fortner II, an alterna-
tive conclusion might be that the plaintiff was not buying the pre-
fabricated homes from U.S. Steel because of the asserted require-
ment, and not because of anything special about the seller's money,
but because the combination of credit and homes was particularly
attractive. Thus, under this analysis there was no "tie-in" at all,
express or implied.
This solution is not only disingenuous, but it is fraught with all
the difficulties that flow from attempting to mitigate a perceived
overinclusive per se rule by juggling the definition of the conduct.'70
In fact, the defendant was unsuccessful in rebutting Fortner's asser-
tions that he took the defendant's homes only because that was the
condition for getting its credit. The preferred alternative is to admit
that given the conclusions in Fortner I, the Fortner II decision was
wrong. Notwithstanding the asserted lack of injury to the seller's
competitors, the buyer was injured by the tie. This should be
enough to result in holding such an express tie-in unreasonable per
se. Although this result may appear harsh, it is the inevitable result
based upon the conclusion that credit was a separate product from
the goods that were purchased with that credit. Furthermore, it
should be some comfort that the typical, straightforward sale of
goods on credit would not be reached under the Fortner rules.'
Another example of an express tie-in that might create prob-
lems is the fact pattern offered by Justice Black in Northern Pacific.
His opinion posited that "one of a dozen food stores in a community
were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar . . .
[while] its competitors were ready and able to sell flour by it-
self.' 2 Black implied that since the seller had no dominance over
the tying product, the attempted restraint probably would not be
unlawful because "any restraint of trade . . . would obviously be
169. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
170. For a discussion of the unfortunate effect of such an approach to group boy-
cotts-because some lower federal courts are unhappy with the Supreme Court's statement
that all such boycotts are unreasonable per se-see Bauer, supra note 9.
171. Compare 429 U.S. at 622 (Burger, C.J., concurring), with 394 U.S. at 507 ("It will
be time enough to pass on the issue of credit sales when a case involving it actually arises.")
172. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958).
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insignificant at most."1 73
The analysis offered above as an alternative in Fortner could
apply here as well. To find the conduct lawful, one might argue that
despite the seller's apparently explicit conditioning of the sale of
flour on the purchase of sugar, there was no express tie. If an indi-
vidual chose to buy from that merchant, his choice presumably
reflected only the fact that the buyer wanted both products anyway,
that he was indifferent as to the seller, and that the seller was as
convenient as any of the other eleven merchants. 74 Stated another
way, the purchase of the package was voluntary, rather than the
result of coercion. If the "condition" on the sale was completely
ineffective, that condition could not have produced the package
sale; rather, it was the result of the buyer's independent choice, and
hence there was no tie-in.
Even in this situation, this Article would treat Justice Black's
hypothetical differently: if there were more than a de minimis
amount of commerce restrained in the tied product market, this
arrangement would also be unlawful per se. Although the alterna-
tive explanation is perfectly plausible, there is no reason why the
antitrust laws should tolerate even this doubtful tie. There is no
suggestion that allowing this merchant to market his goods in this
way has any benefit to the economy. Furthermore, we cannot be
sure that he really is identical to all the other merchants. He may
be the only store open on Sunday, or he may be the only merchant
offering home delivery, or the only one selling flour in ten pound
bags, or, to borrow a page from Fortner, the only one who offers more
credit to his customers than the amount of groceries they buy.
It is probably true that this particular tie will have no adverse
effect on competition, although this is not certain. On the other
hand, it almost surely will produce no benefits. If there is a chance
that a court will guess wrong, and if in any event large amounts of
time and money will have to be expended to examine the exact
effect, we are better off with a simple rule outlawing this practice,
since that rule will be cost free. Furthermore, having the rule will
insure that in the future sellers will never impose these restraints.
2. Implied Tie-ins
Determination of whether certain facts will allow the trier of
fact to infer the existence of a tying arrangement-whether there is
an implied tie-in-will become far more crucial under the approach
173. Id. at 6, followed in Hill v. A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. Another possible explanation might be that the package price of the two products
was lower than the prices of the two products when taken separately.
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suggested by this Article than under present law, since this inquiry
will also determine liability. To avoid a potentially overinclusive
definition, courts should examine not only the factors outlined
above,' but should also consider the existence and use of the defen-
dant's market power in the tying product market.
It is useful to repeat the reason why this power is relevant to
the determination of the existence of a tie-in. Present law distin-
guishes between the voluntary choice by the buyer to take both
products-which is lawful-and the coerced requirement that both
be taken-which may be unlawful. Economic theory posits that the
seller will be able to impose the tie only if the buyer has a sufficient
desire or need for the tying product that it is willing to bear certain
onerous conditions, including, perhaps, the requirement that it also
purchase a second, less desirable product.' Thus, if there indeed
is a tie, the defendant must have had market power to impose it,
and must have used that power. Absent that power, the defendant
could not have coerced the buyer to take both of its products; rather,
the purchase of both products must have been voluntary. Therefore,
the analysis of market power is another avenue to determine
whether the alleged tie-in was the product of the seller's coercion,
that is, whether there is a "tie" in the antitrust sense at all. 77
The usual approach for determining the defendant's market
power is by analysis of whether the tying product is "unique" or
"particularly desirable" to a group of potential purchasers.' If
there are several sellers offering the identical product at identical
prices, the seller will be unable to effect a tie-in. If, on the other
hand, the seller's product is sufficiently differentiated that at a
175. See text accompanying notes 95-110 supra.
176. Justice Black's flour-sugar hypothetical is probably an exception to this assertion.
Nevertheless, the benefits of a per se rule when dealing with express tie-ins are such as to
outweigh any desirability of finding out if the seller really had any market power.
177. Additional confusion has crept in from cases that require proof not only that the
defendant had market power but also that it used that power. See, e.g., Capital Temporaries,
Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 365 F. Supp. 888, 892 (D. Conn. 1973), affl'd, 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974).
If the seller only offered the tying product on the condition that the tied product be taken as
well, and if both products were taken by the buyer subject to that condition, that surely
should be enough to prove "use" of the market power. Note, Tying Arrangements and the
Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VAND. L. REv. 755, 759 (1977).
Proof that the buyer was coerced by the defendant's market power to purchase the tied
product should be proof that there indeed was a tying arrangement. "[Tihe plaintiff must
establish that he was the unwilling purchaser of the tied product. If he was not coerced by
the economic dominance of the seller, he at least must show that he was compelled to accept
the tied product by virtue of the uniqueness or desirability of the tying product, which other
competitors could not or would not supply." Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506
F.2d 658, 663 (2d Cir. 1974).
178. See text accompanying notes 132-46 supra.
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given price some buyers want only that product, then the seller has
some market power with respect to those buyers. If other competi-
tors cannot, or even simply choose not to, offer that same product
which those buyers very much desire, the seller will be able to im-
pose certain conditions on its sale. One way to exercise that market
power would be to raise the price of the product. Fundamental
economics, however, teaches that even for that unique and desirable
product, a rise in price will result in some fall-off in buyer demand.
Another option for the seller is to require the buyer to take another
product as well.
The difficulty with primary reliance on "uniqueness" or
"desirability" to demonstrate the sufficient economic power of the
tying product is that it may not give enough information, especially
if this is to satisfy both the existence and the liability prongs of the
per se test.'79 As the Court has observed in other contexts, in one
sense almost every product is unique,"'0 if only because of its trade-
mark, the package in which it is sold, and so forth. Yet, just as in
the merger or monopolization contexts the courts properly look be-
yond these facts to determine the relevant product market, so in the
tying arrangement context a court ought to look beyond the mere
uniqueness of the tying product. The question is whether the prod-
uct is sufficiently differentiated and desirable to a particular seg-
ment of the buying public that an appreciable number of persons
will want to have that product even if its price is raised or-the
equivalent for our purposes-if a portion of its price includes the
added cost of having to take other products in order to purchase that
179. The unsatisfactory results that can occur if sole reliance in determining market
power is placed on the "uniqueness" or "desirability" of the tying products are illustrated
by the rule applied to patented, copyrighted, or other "inherently unique" products. The
Court has held that these legal barriers to competition in the tying product will suffice to
demonstrate the seller's market power. See note 133 supra. Although it is true that patents
prevent competition for that very same product, other competitors may have "invented
around" the tying product, or its inventiveness may be sufficiently minor as not to command
much leverage for its owner. Indeed, in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 305 (1949), the Court had said the following about defendant's patented machines in the
earlier International Salt case: "[Ilt was not established that equivalent machines were
unobtainable, it was not indicated what proportion of the business of supplying such ma-
chines was controlled by defendant, and it was deemed irrelevant that there was no evidence
as to the actual effect of the tying clauses upon competition." See also, Singer, supra note 4,
at 660-62. The harsh mechanical treatment of tie-ins involving patented tying products is
difficult to explain except perhaps on historical grounds. See note 1 supra. The elimination
of further analysis of the realities of market power for these "inherently unique" tying prod-
ucts, while the Court has raised the levels of proof necessary for other tying products, is
further evidence of the great confusion surrounding this subject area.
180. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325-26 (1962) (merger
action); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1956) (relevant
market in monopolization action).
19801
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
desired item.' 1 Even if a product is "unique," the products of its
competitors may also have distinct qualities, so that a significant
rise in price or imposition of other burdens will lead to consumer
substitutions.
The "uniqueness" test is in considerable disarray today.
International Salt, Northern Pacific, and Loew's stand for the prop-
osition that if other sellers cannot reproduce the tying prod-
uct-either because, as in the patent or copyright situation, it is
legally protected, or like land, it is inherently unique-the plaintiff
has met its burden of showing "sufficient economic power." On the
other hand, when the product is less differentiated-or like credit,
virtually fungible-then the plaintiff's task is far more difficult.
The prior alternate means of satisfying the "uniqueness" test
were eroded by Fortner II. As noted, the Court held that it is not
enough that U.S. Steel may have been the only company offering
the particular low interest, 100 percent financing loans. Plaintiff
also had to show that "the seller has some advantage not shared
by his competitors in the market for the tying product."'' 2 Yet,
for the purpose of evaluating the impact on the potential buyer of
the tie-and thus for evaluating the defendant's market power in
the tying product-the fact that other competitors chose not to
offer the tying product should be irrelevant.13 All that really
matters to the buyer is that the defendant has something that the
buyer wants and that no one else will offer. The choice of the buyer
is equally foreclosed whether the buyer has a patent or cost advan-
tage in the tying product or the competitors of the seller have volun-
tarily chosen not to offer the tying product.
Another approach to proof of market power-with which courts
and commentators have wrestled for many years-is the evidentiary
value to be drawn from the mere fact that one or more buyers have
accepted the two products pursuant to the tie."' Absent some mar-
181. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969).
182. 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
183. One explanation for the imposition of this requirement is suggested by an analogy
to certain merger cases, which offered the competitive advantage the merged firm would have
over its smaller rivals as a justification for condemning the acquisition under § 7 of the
Clayton Act. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Indeed,
the Court's opinion in Fortner I is replete with references to the extensi e size of the seller
and the advantages this might give it in the credit market. The Court in Fortner II, however,
stood this antipathy to the competitive advantage of large sellers on its head by making it
the principal measure of the uniqueness of an undifferentiated tying product. Moreover, even
if the principal concern is with the effect on the seller's competitors, it is obvious that they
will be equally foreclosed regardless of the source of the seller's market power in the tying
product-whether it is some economic advantage or some other factor such as more clever
advertising or willingness to take greater risks. See Handler, supra note 21, at 168.
184. See text accompanying notes 134 & 169 supra.
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ket power, sellers could never impose a tie-in at all. In cases prior
to Fortner II, courts suggested that the mere existence of a host of
tying arrangements might be sufficient evidence, by itself, to dem-
onstrate this market power, if the defendant could not provide a
satisfactory alternative explanation for the buyer's purchase of both
products.' Yet Fortner II rejected this seemingly obvious conclu-
sion. Instead, it stands for the proposition that a host of ties may
equally well demonstrate that the seller was offering both products
on particularly attractive terms, and that a number of purchasers
recognized this and took advantage of the package deal.'86
This line of inquiry seems merely to have brought the analysis
full circle. The large number of tying arrangements is not dispositive
of market power because even they may have been voluntary rather
than coerced. Although it may be one piece of evidence, 8 the Court
said that this still does not answer why so many tie-ins were ac-
cepted. 18 Therefore, we are required to find other means of demon-
strating the existence of the tie-in. The problem with Fortner II is
that the single alternative it suggests-did the seller have some
special edge, of a cost nature or otherwise, or could other sellers have
offered the tying product on equal terms if they had chosen to do
so 8' -is too narrow, in part because it ignores some of the evils that
flow from tying arrangements. 10
185. Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977); Advance
Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62, 68 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970); AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430,
437 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See also L. SuLLivAN, supra note 68, at § 152, at 440.
186. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 618 n.10
(1977). See also Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1225 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
187. Cases after Fortner II continue to view the large number of ties as some evidence
that the seller coercively imposed a tying arrangement. See, e.g., Fifth Moorings Condomi-
nium, Inc. v. Shere, 81 F.R.D. 712, 716 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
188. Given these two alternate explanations, it might be appropriate for the courts to
adopt a rule that this evidence makes out a prima facie case of the defendant's market power,
and that introduction of this evidence shifts the burden of proof to the seller to show that
the large number of "package deals" were voluntary.
189. Without any evidence that the Credit Corp. had some cost advantage over its
competitors-or could offer a form of financing that was significantly differentiated from
that which other lenders could offer if they so elected-the unique character of its
financing does not support the conclusion that petitioners had the kind of economic
power which Fornter had the burden of proving in order to prevail in this litigation.
429 U.S. at 622.
190. Not only is the Fortner II requirement that the tying product's uniqueness must
flow-when not the result of some legal barrier-from some financial advantage of the seller
too narrow an inquiry; this standard is unworkable and focuses on inappropriate criteria. One
wonders whether the Court contemplates the introduction of evidence of the actual cost data
of producing the tying product-which would require allocation of various input factors by
an integrated producer-and then a comparison of these data with the input costs of the
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The earlier discussion" ' suggested a number of factors that
would allow the trier of fact to infer the existence of a tying arrange-
ment-examination of the practical implications of the contract
itself; information about the parties' bargaining and relationship;
technological combinations; and offering the two products at a
package price. This Article has urged that the existence and use of
market power is another extremely important factor in showing that
a tie-in exists. If these previously mentioned factors and the large
numbers of tie-ins are not dispositive on this point, what other
evidence might be helpful?
One useful approach is to borrow some of the learning of section
2 of the Sherman Act. In determining if the defendant has monopoly
power, even if it controls considerably less than 100% of the market,
courts look to market structure and performance as well as to the
defendant's conduct." 2 Thus, in addition to looking at the defen-
dant's market share, relevant inquiries include abnormally high
profit levels, decline in the number of competitors, artificial product
differentiation by advertising or the like, high capital or technologi-
cal barriers to entry, and so forth. Similarly this kind of information
would indicate whether the defendant could exercise its leverage to
compel purchase of the tied product. This, combined with evidence
of the defendant's conduct, should help identify whether the defen-
dant has, and used, its market power.
Other relevant factors that might be considered are the price
of the products and whether the two products are sold in fixed or
variable proportions. The price of the two products can be strong
evidence of a tie-in.' 3 If the tying product is less expensive than
expected while the tied product is more expensive, this suggests a
tie-in, since otherwise the purchaser probably would have elected to
take only the tying product from that seller."' If the combined price
seller's competitors. Yet, this enormously complicated, and doubtlessly fruitless, inquiry
would be required properly to determine cost advantages. Furthermore, if this evidence is
required, this approach would be grossly inconsistent with other antitrust (and general eco-
nomic) objectives. It suggests that in certain situations, tie-ins will be unlawful only if the
seller is more efficient (i.e., has cost advantages), while the less efficient seller could engage
in those same practices. See Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment on a Recent Anti-
trust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 43-47 (1978).
191. See text accompanying notes 95-110 supra.
192. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 68,- § 6 at 22-9.
193. See, e.g., Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976); Hill v.
A-T-O, Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1354 (2d Cir. 1976).
194. Accord, Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1977);
Turner, supra note 78, at 63. But see, United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.,
429 U.S. 610, 618 (1977) (such pricing may also evidence vigorous competition); Flinn, Fort-
ner: Sufficient Economic Power Over the Tying Product, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 615 (1977).
This practice would be consistent with the economist's analysis, see text accompanying notes
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of both products is higher than a competitive price for the same
package, this seems conclusive evidence of a tie-in. Sale of the two
products in varying proportions certainly does not preclude the pos-
sibility that there is a tie-in. Sale of the two products to all buyers
in equal, fixed proportions, however, seems to indicate a tie-in, since
one would normally expect that if the buyers were acting completely
independently, they would sometimes take different ratios of the
two products or not take one or the other at all.
195
The development of a test for the existence of an implied tie,
when the consequence will be per se unreasonableness, will require
some case by case explication. In the long run, however, the ap-
proach offered above should simplify the analysis. Of equal import-
ance, the discussion of the merits of tying arrangements makes clear
that there is no reason for retaining the present two-step analysis.
B. Defenses
The significance of the defenses specified above' for this pro-
posed new approach can be explained quickly. The defenses embody
the exceptions to the general proposition that tying arrangements
rarely have procompetitive value. To the extent that a seller can
show that the use of tying arrangements will produce specific bene-
fits that outweigh any harm to competition, the ties should be per-
mitted as exceptions to the per se rule. The burden of proof, how-
ever, should be on the defendant to show that the same results could
not have been achieved by less restrictive alternatives.'
C. Eliminating Certain Anomalies
Over the years, a number of anomalies have crept into the
already confusing rules regarding tying arrangements. When the
Court makes the break with the past approach outlined here, it
28-45 supra, of the use of tie-ins to capture a portion of the consumer's surplus or to effect
price discrimination. Obviously, lower quality of either product can be the equivalent of
higher price.
195. Of course, there are some combinations that are almost always used in fixed
proportions. Thus, if the left shoe and the right shoe were deemed separate products, see text
accompanying notes 77-85 supra, almost all purchasers would nonetheless take both. On the
other hand, since even here one might expect a small number of persons to take only one or
the other, the fact that all buyers took them in fixed proportions (here, one-to-one) would at
least be evidence of a tie-in.
196. See text accompanying notes 152-63 supra.
197. If it is clear that there are no reasonable alternatives to the use of tying arrange-
ments to perform the function of a counting device for a tying product used in variable
proportions, and if their use would promote greater total output of the tying product, see text




should simultaneously make certain additional changes that will
simplify the analysis. These difficulties are-(1) although both the
Sherman and Clayton Acts apply to tie-ins, different tests of legality
are used under these two statutes; (2) the courts have also applied
different standards for finding liability based on the nature of the
plaintiff; and (3) the rule of reason approach may be attractive in
theory, but it has never been implemented and should be expressly
discarded.
1. Different Standards Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts
Section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to tie-ins that involve
the sale or lease of goods or commodities. Therefore, if the tie-in
takes the form of a license, or if either the tying or tied product is a
service, a trademark, money, or land, then section 1 of the Sherman
Act is used.'98 Over twenty-five years ago, in the Times-Picayune
decision, the Supreme Court established different tests for per se
illegality depending on whether the conduct falls under the Sher-
man Act or the Clayton Act.'" For unexplained reasons, the Court
held that the necessary showing of presumptive injury to competi-
tion would be made out under the Clayton Act if the transaction had
certain effects in the market of either the tying or of the tied prod-
uct. On the other hand, if the challenge were under the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff relying on the per se rule would have to show the
requisite effect in both markets.
The cases indicate that a stricter standard is appropriate under
the Clayton Act, since that statute deals with "incipient" Sherman
Act violations.2m In the tying arrangement context, however, this
difference makes no sense. If one agrees that tying arrangements
injure competition, and therefore should be proscribed-or, equally,
if one argues that the effect of these transactions is trivial-there is
no noticeable difference in the level of competitive injury depending
on the nature of the products involved or the method by which they
are transferred from seller to buyer.21' Since this particular distinc-
tion has no foundation either in the language of either statute or in
their legislative histories, there is no reason to retain it. Some
courts, in fact, seem to have abandoned the distinction.2 2 Instead,
198. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
199. 345 U.S. 608-10 (1953). See notes 126-28 supra and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962) (discuss-
ing legislative history of 1950 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act); Standard Oil Co. of Cal.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 297 & n.4 (1949) (discussing the legislative history of § 3 of
the Clayton Act).
201. See Turner, supra note 78, at 58.
202. Several recent cases have suggested that the difference in standards under § 1 of
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they have applied the expanded Sherman Act test to cases brought
under the Clayton Act. For the sake of simplicity and consistency,
this Article suggests that the approach adopted here be applied to
all tying arrangements.2s3
2. Different Standards for Different Plaintiffs
The seller who engages in the tie-in may be sued by at least four
different categories *of plaintiffs. One reason for the lack of consis-
tent legal standards for evaluating tying arrangements is that courts
have applied different standards of liability in each of these catego-
ries. The seller who engages in a tying arrangement may be sued by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice; by the Federal
Trade Commission; by a competitor (or even by a would-be compet-
itor) of the seller in the market for the tied product; or by the buyer
who was the object of the tie and was unable to buy the tied product
elsewhere (or lost the option to buy nothing at all).214
the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act no longer prevails. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 521 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting); Spartan
Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. James H. Matthews &
Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,
415 F.2d 55, 67 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). Accord, Handler, supra
note 21, at 161 (Fortner I "came close to eliminating a long-standing antitrust anomaly"). In
addition, in a case involving full line forcing, a variation of tying arrangements discussed in
text accompanying notes 111-14 supra, a court applied the Sherman Act test of looking to
both the tying and tied market effects to a claim asserted under § 3 of the Clayton Act.
Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 100-01 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
Other recent cases have reiterated without questioning the differing standards. See, e.g.,
Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 708 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum);
Aqua Flame, Inc. v. Imperial Fountains, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 736, 739 (N.D. Tex. 1979);
Robbins Flooring, Inc. v. Federal Floors, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 4, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
203. In addition, the FTC may challenge tying arrangements under § 5 of the FTC Act.
The standard of illegality is different than that of either the Sherman or Clayton Act. See
notes 121-22 supra and 205-07 infra and accompanying text.
204. The shift in enforcement in recent years from government actions to private treble
damage actions has been dramatic. In 1964, cases brought by the Antitrust Division ac-
counted for 18.6% of all antitrust suits filed in the courts. By 1977, governmental actions
accounted for only 4.6% of all antitrust filings. ANNUAL REPORT OF DmECTOR OF ADMiN. OFFIcE
OF U.S. COURTS 1977, at 208, table 20. In the tying arrangement context, this trend is illus-
trated by the Supreme Court cases. Until 1969, all tying cases against sellers were prosecuted
either by the Justice Department or the FTC. Since then, the Court has heard private actions
twice-the two appearances of Fortner-and no government actions. See note 1 supra. Simi-
larly, in the lower courts today the overwhelming majority of cases are private actions.
An interesting illustration of this dramatic shift from governmental to private enforce-
ment of tying arrangements is shown by a statement in a recent Justice Department prosecu-
tion. In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532, 544 n.41 (N.D. Cal.
1978), the court was moved to remark: "This case is somewhat unique among tying actions
because the plaintiff is not the person allegedly required to accept unwanted products or
services . ... "
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The Antitrust Division may bring an action under either the
Sherman or Clayton Act. The Commission may bring an action
under either section 3 of the Clayton Act 05 or under section 5 of the
F.T.C. Act. Section 5 has been interpreted not only to include all
Sherman section 1 violations-therefore incorporating those stan-
dards when the Commission sues-but also to reach "incipient anti-
trust violations. ' 206 Therefore, when the Commission brings an ac-
tion under section 5, it may be able to condemn certain tying ar-
rangements that would not be unlawful under either the Sherman
or the Clayton Act.
2
11
When the action is brought by a private plaintiff suing pur-
suant to section 4 of the Clayton Act for treble damages, courts often
look to the nature of the injury to the plaintiff to determine what
should be a prior inquiry-whether an antitrust violation exists at
all. Occasionally this may be part of an effort to prevent private
plaintiffs from reaping a "windfall profit." Thus, when a disaffected
buyer asserts that the seller engaged in an unlawful tying arrange-
ment, courts have inappropriately asked whether other sellers who
also offered the tied product were foreclosed from the market; find-
ing none, the courts hold that there was no antitrust violation. 28
Even if there were no competing sellers, and hence no foreclosure,
the buyer may nonetheless have been forced to take the tied product
when it would have preferred to take nothing at all. Similarly, suits
by competing sellers would be inappropriately rejected if the only
ground therefore was that the buyers were indifferent as to the
choice of the offeror of the tied product.0 '
In both instances involving the private plaintiff, it is important
205. Section 11(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 21(a) (1976), specifically authorizes
the Commission to enforce § 3 of that Act.
206. See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
207. In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966), the respondent had engaged in
conduct having overtones both of exclusive dealing and tying arrangements. Brown fran-
chised shoe stores, and in exchange for providing "certain valuable services"-for example,
architectural plans, merchandising records, services of a field representative, and a right to
participate in group life insurance-it insisted that those franchisees not deal in the shoes of
its competitors. Those services-the tying products-were provided only to franchisees exe-
cuting this exclusive dealing agreement. The Court did not label this conduct in Clayton § 3
terms. Rather, it adopted the Commission's characterization of it as an "unfair method of
competition," and then emphasized that FTC Act § 5 could reach this conduct even if it were
not unlawful under the antitrust laws. This decision is criticized in Handler, Some Misadven-
tures in Antitrust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 YALE L.J. 92, 93-101 (1966).
208. See, e.g., Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1221 n.7a (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F.
Supp. 532, 544 & n.40 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
209. Cf. Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 32 (7th Cir.
1976) (existence of other potential buyers bar to suit by competing seller).
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to recall that treble damage suits are encouraged because the plain-
tiff is serving as a "private attorney general. ' 2'0 By virtue of such
suits, enforcement of the antitrust laws is expanded beyond what
would occur if only the government were permitted to sue. There-
fore, the courts should simply ask whether, if the government were
suing, a violation would have been made out. Then, if recovery for
the plaintiff would be inequitable, damages might be reduced or
even eliminated on the ground that the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate the necessary standing1 ' or the requisite injury to its trade or
business called for by section 4 of the Clayton Act.212 To shortcut
this analysis by holding that in these cases there simply was no
violation will only contribute to the confusion prevailing today.
3. Rule of Reason Approach
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that tying
arrangements may be unlawful either if they satisfy all of the ele-
ments of the per se rule or, even if the per se standard is not satis-
fied, if the conduct is unreasonable.2 13 On its surface, having these
two alternatives makes sense. In its application, however, the dis-
tinction is meaningless.2 4 The author's research has not turned up
a single case in which a court first held the conduct lawful under
the per se approach, but then condemned it under the rule of reason
test.2
5
The classic definition of the considerations applicable to a rule
of reason approach is found in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion in
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.2 6 Looking, as he sug-
210. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2326, 2333-34 (1979); Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969).
211. See, e.g., Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1976).
212. Thus, it does seem fair to require the plaintiff to show that it was injured by the
defendant's conduct, either by having to pay more for the goods or by receiving lower quality.
See generally, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Keener v.
Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F.2d 453, 453-56 (5th Cir. 1979); Warriner Hermetics, Inc.
v. Copeland Refrig. Corp., 463 F.2d 1002, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1086 (1972);
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108, 120-23 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Areeda,
Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1127 (1976).
213. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499-500
(1969); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
214. See generally, Dam, supra note 21, at 32-5.
215. Accord, Note, The Presumption of Market Power in Sales of Legally Differentiated
Tying Products, 56 TEXAS L. REv. 1305, 1305 n.2 (1978). But see In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 393, 401 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (on motion to dismiss: competitors of sellers
for the tying product may not rely on per se rule, but may assert action under Rule of Reason);
Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1096 (D. Minn. 1973) (Rule of
Reason applies to tying arrangements when per se standards are inapplicable).
216. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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gested, at the history of the tie-in, the defendant's purposes, the evil
aimed at, the actual effect on competition, and so forth, it is hard
to imagine considerations that a court might adopt that would go
beyond the factors already considered in the per se approach. If the
economists' view prevails-that tie-ins usually have no adverse ef-
fect on competition-then a per se rule is unjustified in the first
place. Once the determination is made that a per se approach is
appropriate, however, then there is no reason for reconsidering the
same factors in individual cases under a purported rule of reason
approach. In short, nothing more could be gained because there
should be nothing more to consider. Holding out a second chance
for success to plaintiffs will be a hoax, wasting the time of the
litigants and the court. Therefore, the rhetoric that the rule of rea-
son also applies to tying arrangements should be explicitly dis-
carded. If the Court really meant what it said-that tying arrange-
ments rarely have procompetitive benefits-then there is no reason
to shy away from a per se test. The test proposed in this Article still
leaves room for appropriate specific defenses.
V. CONCLUSION
Tying arrangements often harm competition and rarely yield
any benefits. The explanation for tie-ins offered by economists may
cast doubt on the theory courts have used to explain this conduct,
but it does not undermine the appropriateness of the per se ap-
proach. Since there is little reason to permit tie-ins, there is no
sound justification for a two step analysis-first of existence, then
of liability. The test for evaluating the legality of tie-ins should
combine the factors presently examined in these two steps. If a tie-
in is found to exist, courts should proceed immediately to considera-
tion of any justifications for the conduct.
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